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ABSTRACT 
 In accordance with the U.S. Army’s current modernization efforts, this thesis 
examines the Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha in great power competition.  
The purpose of this research is to analyze the current tactical capability of Army Special 
Forces to determine what organizational modification or optimization is required to be 
successful in the future operating environment. The authors examined case studies of 
historic modification and determined that the prevailing causes of capability adaptation 
have been driven by political, economic, societal, and technological environmental 
change. The authors then applied these factors to current global trends to determine 
necessary future adaptation. Based on this research, the authors recommend an 
information warfare specialist within the Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha 
to ensure relevancy and success in the future environment. 
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1 
I.  UNITED STATES SPECIAL FORCES ORIGINS 
        As a primer to this topic, it is essential to examine the origin of the United 
States Special Forces (USSF) and comprehend the unit’s original capability. From this, it 
is possible to depict an uninterrupted line of adaptation of the Special Forces Operational 
Detachment-Alpha (SFOD-A). While there are numerous Special Operations units which 
preceded its creation, USSF and its core mission of Unconventional Warfare (UW) can 
most definitively trace its origin to the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) during World War 
II (WWII). 
A. U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITY IN WWII  
The United States’ late entry into WWII meant that mobilization efforts lagged 
behind axis and allies in the war. To enable rapid expansion of capability, especially in 
regard to specialized units, the United States drew from British units that demonstrated 
strategic capability. Such was the case of with OSS, which drew its impetus from the 
British Special Operations Executive (SOE). Formed in 1940, the SOE was created by 
merging the offices of “Section D of MI6” and “General Staff (Research),” a branch of the 
War Office.1  The initial purpose of this unit was to organize and establish British-backed 
resistance groups, provide intelligence, and wage a guerrilla war against the Nazis and 
Italians in occupied territories.2  Impressed with the British commando units, U.S. senior 
ranking generals like George C. Marshall became interested in creating similar capabilities 
for the United States.3   
As the U.S. had no SOF at the start of WWII, multiple avenues were initially 
attempted to create units capable of generating operational and strategic effects similar the 
SOE. The initial focus of the U.S. Army was the creation of elite infantry units to execute 
 
1 A. R. B. Linderman, Rediscovering Irregular Warfare: Colin Gubbins and the Origins of Britain’s 
Special Operations Executive (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), 2. 
2 Richard Gough, SOE Singapore: 1941-42 (Singapore: Heinemann, 1985). 
3 Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, Rev. ed, (Lawrence, KS University Press 
of Kansas, 2002). 
2 
commando operations. These units included the U.S. Army Rangers and the joint U.S. / 
Canadian venture known as the 1st Special Service Force.4  However, like their British 
counterparts, these units suffered excruciating losses and provided limited strategic impact 
because they were often employed conventionally to achieve tactical results.5   
1. The Office of Strategic Service; European Concept 
Similarly impressed by the British SOE was WWI Medal of Honor recipient turned 
influential attorney and personal advisor to President Roosevelt, William “Wild Bill” 
Donovan.6  The concept that Donovan lobbied and ultimately received approval for, was 
drastically different than the commando operations that were to be executed. Rather than 
creating shock-troops, Donovan foresaw the need for a “paramilitary-like organization [to 
conduct] a variety of wartime missions unconventional in nature.”7  This unit would not 
focus on attacking hard targets but would instead, follow Winston Churchill’s directive to 
the SOE and attempt to “set Europe ablaze” through sabotage, subversion, and ambush.8  
Donovan’s personality and understanding of the strategic context which, in his view 
demanded the creation of the OSS, shaped his initial perceptions of the unit’s wartime role. 
To this end, Donovan assumed that any mission that was not conventional would naturally 
belong to his organization.9  However, clarification via a directive from the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, limited his unit’s role to “the organization and conduct of guerilla warfare” and 
restricted assigned personnel to roles as “organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei of 
 
4 For a more detailed history of the U.S. Army Ranger contributions during WWII, read David W. 
Hogan, “The Evolution of the Concept of the U.S. Army’s Rangers, 1942-1983” (Duke University, 1986). 
5 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare. 
6 Douglas C. Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American 
Espionage (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011). 
7 Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998), 34. 
8 Hugh Dalton and Ben Pimlott, The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton: 1940 - 1945 (London: 
Cape, 1986), 62. 
9 Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action. 
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guerilla units.”10  These restrictions became part of the OSS’ culture and shaped how its 
operational units organized to accomplish the organization’s objectives.  
2. The Operational Groups  
As the OSS grew into a formal unit, its responsibilities increased, and it organized 
into unique elements based on mission demand. In Europe, the largest of these units was 
the Operational Group (OG). The OGs consisted of U.S. Army French-speaking volunteers 
divided into two 15-man sections each with two officers and 13 enlisted men. Many of the 
personnel had backgrounds in combat arms and had previously served as engineers, 
signalmen, and medics.11  The main task of the OG was to insert behind enemy lines, 
organize resistance elements, and conduct sabotage and subversion to cut off enemy lines 
of communication (see Figure 1).12  These capabilities and missions would later be 
mirrored during the creation of the SFOD-A. 
 
 
10 United States. War Department, War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) (NY: Walker, 
1976), 223. 
11 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986); 
OSS, “Operational Groups Field Manual of Strategic Services, Office of Strategic Services,” World War II: 
U.S. Documents on Planning, Operations, Intelligence, Axis War Crimes, and Refugees : Records of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1: 1942-1945, Strategic Issues: Production and Assignment of War Materials, 
Shipping, Aircraft, Petroleum, Propaganda and Unconventional Warfare, War Crimes and Prisoners of 
War, Conferences, 1944. 
12 Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action. 
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Figure 1. The OSS Operational Group structure13 
3. Jedburgh Teams 
Another element, smaller in size compared to the OGs, were Jedburgh Teams. 
These three-man units derived their name from the listed codename of their base in 
Scotland and parachuted into occupied Europe to support resistance operations in 
Europe.14  An important difference in the Jedburgh’s capability was the requirement that 
each team incorporate a non-American native speaker from the assigned operational 
area.15  Additionally, because of their size, Jedburgh teams were not formed by a higher 
headquarters but instead allowed individuals to form their own unit from a pool of 
operators. The use of this unique unit formation technique ensured team cohesion for the 
units which were destined to operate deep behind enemy lines.  
 
13 Office of Strategic Services, “Operational Group Command,” OSS Primer, December 1944, 
https://www.soc.mil/OSS/assets/operational-groups-overview.pdf. 
14 Wyman W. Irwin, “A Special Force: Origin and Development of the Jedburgh Project in Support of 
Operation Overlord,” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991). 
15 Bank, From OSS to Green Berets; Irwin, “A Special Force.” 
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4. The Office of Strategic Service; Pacific Theater Concept 
While there were many successes for the OSS in Europe, there were also many 
failures due in large part to the organization’s lack of experience.16  The OSS unit which 
saw perhaps the greatest success during WWII was Detachment 101 which conducted 
operations in Burma. Established in 1942, Detachment 101 grew from a modest 21-man 
force, to one that consisted of over 9,200 guerillas with over 1,000 allied servicemembers 
serving in its ranks throughout the war.17  Like other OSS units, Detachment 101 initially 
benefitted by its commander’s ability to hand select personnel. These men were then 
trained and cross-trained for a variety of missions throughout the Pacific Theater of 
Operations. As noted by Troy Sacquety in his detailed account of the unit’s history:  
One each was involved in administration, photography, medical, research 
and development, secret intelligence, special funds, two in supply, three in 
training; while five personnel each were assigned to communications, and 
special operations. It must be stressed again that each of these men 
performed a multitude of tasks. Their duties represent the first melding of 
OSS functions in Detachment 101; however, that these men were in reality 
all from the Special Operations (SO) Branch is significant. This established 
from the beginning that regardless of a man’s branch and training, he 
performed the duties deemed of the greatest need.18 
As important for success as the hand-selection of candidates was the geographic 
benefit of the unit due to its basing proximity near the forward edge of Allied defenses 
against the Japanese. Whereas European OSS units generally had to infiltrate and remain 
in occupied territory, Detachment 101, was able to conduct short-duration penetration 
patrols, return, reassess, and retrain. Moreover, because Detachment 101 operated outside 
the main theater of operations, their operations were largely more independent and less 
available for misuse by right-intentioned but misguided officers. This operational 
familiarity, independency, and cross-training would have a lasting impact on the OSS and 
the future USSF.  
 
16 Troy James Sacquety, “The Organizational Evolution of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma, 1942–
1945,” PhD Diss., Texas A&M University, 2008. 
17 Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Service).: The Overseas Targets, 
1976, 391–92. 
18 Sacquety, “The Organizational Evolution of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma, 1942–1945,” 37. 
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B. POST-WAR DOLDRUMS FOR U.S. SOF 
Following the surrender of Germany and Japan, the U.S. began to rapidly decrease 
the number of personnel and units within the military. Following historic precedent, SOF 
were some of the first units offered by Army leadership for immediate deactivation. The 
death of President Roosevelt six months prior to the end of WWII, left the OSS without 
presidential protection and on 20 September 1945, President Truman ordered the unit’s 
deactivation. Unrelenting in his vision of the need for the OSS, Donovan protested the 
deactivation and, following President Truman’s decision, he began a two-year lobbying 
campaign to reactivate the capability. The result of his effort was the creation of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.19  In the meantime, the military continued to purge itself of SOF 
reducing the United States’ strategic capability outside of conventional operations. 
1. Birth of the U.S. Psychological Warfare Center 
Whereas the CIA owes its official creation in 1947 to the struggles of General 
Donovan, the rebirth of Army SOF, particularly Psychological Warfare and USSF, owe 
their reestablishment to the efforts of General Robert McClure. McClure had been the 
Chief of Psychological Warfare in the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF) during WWII. Following the military’s SOF purge at the end of WWII, McClure 
began an “aggressive letter writing campaign in 1946” extolling the virtues of 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and UW.20  The outbreak of the Korean War, and the 
communists’ adept use of propaganda facilitated the precipitous return of U.S. PSYOP 
efforts. To facilitate the rapid return, McClure received approval to create the Special 
Operations Division at Smoke Bomb Hill on Fort Bragg, NC. Unsurprisingly, the new 
division staff was filled with respected former members of the OSS who “put their 
collective experiences to work” for McClure.”21 
 
19 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 34–35. 
20 Jared Tracy, “The Psychological Warfare Division, the Office of the Chief of Psychological 
Warfare, and the Psywar School at Fort Riley, 1950-1951,” Veritas 7, no. 2 (2011): 26–35. 
21 Charles H. Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring Cheap, Practical SF Training in the Post-Vietnam 
Turmoil,” Veritas 14, no. 1 (2018): 103. 
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2. Creating the Special Forces construct 
Like Donovan, McClure was untiring in his attempt to create a UW capability for 
the military and he recruited former OSS operators to support his initiative.22  These men, 
such as, Aaron Bank, Wendel Fertig, and Russell Volkmann, had extensive experience 
building resistance networks during WWII and formed the nucleus of McClure’s staff. At 
Smoke Bomb Hill, the new staff began the long journey toward creating the framework for 
USSF. Critical to the effort was Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann, who had drafted 
the Army’s field manuals for the Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare and 
Combatting Guerilla Forces while assigned to the Infantry School.23  These manuals, along 
with other research and analysis of guerrilla activities, provided a doctrinal grounding for 
the need for a specialized UW centric unit. Equally important were the real-world 
experiences of Volkmann and the others which made them the only experts of UW in the 
military at the time. These men’s efforts during WWII gave them immense credibility and 
they were widely respected throughout the military. Although they differed in their opinion 
of how the proposed force should be organized, the central theme of stay-behind guerilla 
operations remained a constant.24 
Key to the development of the framework and doctrine of Special Forces were 
numerous engagements by Office of Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) staff, to 
promote the Special Forces concept to the U.S. Army. These engagements included 
meetings between Volkmann and General Lawton Collins, the Chief of Staff of the Army. 
In written correspondence between the two, Volkmann succinctly described and outlined 
the early tenets of the OCPW’s interpretation of what missions Special Forces would 
conduct.25  Additionally, McClure’s staff prepared a brief for General Taylor, the Army 
G-3, about the skills, capabilities, and strategic necessity of a special force.26  As briefed 
 
22 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 119–25. 
23 Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring”; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare. 
24 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare; Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring.” 
25 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 122–23. 
26 Paddock, 126–29. 
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to General Taylor, the mission of UW was a way to generate additional combat power for 
U.S. and the NATO forces, through cooperation with indigenous peoples.27  Or as noted 
more clearly in a training circular the mission of Special Forces was: 
To infiltrate its component operational detachments, by air, sea, or land, to 
designated areas within the enemy’s sphere of influence and organize the 
indigenous guerrilla potential on a quasi-military or a military basis for 
tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with our land, sea, and air 
forces.28  
Impressed with the concept, General Taylor approved the unit’s creation giving the 
OCPW their first victory for the UW concept and enabled the creation of the first Special 
Forces unit, the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG). 
Following Taylor’s approval, the staff of OCPW organized to meet the demands 
associated with the new unit. Here, the OCPW began to run into issues. After a world-wide 
recruiting tour, Lieutenant Colonels Melvin Blair and Volckmann returned to Ft. Bragg 
having enticed many talented individuals to join the unit.29  However, the Adjutant 
Generals office delayed many of the Soldier’s transfer requests resulting in a manning 
crises at the activation of the 10th SFG.30   
C. RECRUITMENT WOES 
The slow transfer rates were due in part to a bureaucratic issue of personnel slots. 
While General Taylor approved the creation of the unit, there were no personnel slots 
available within the Army to fill it.31  Through coincidence, slots were found from the 
Army Rangers which had been activated at the onset of the Korean War, suffered shocking 
 
27 Richard. Bitzinger, Assessing the Conventional Balance in Europe, 1945-1975, N-2859-FF/RC 
(Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp., 1989), 4–7. 
28 Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 106. 
29 Briscoe, 104. 
30 Alfred H. Paddock Jr, US Army Special Warfare, Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional 
Warfare, 1941-1952 (The Minerva Group, Inc., 2002), 21; Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 105. 
31 Hogan, “The Evolution of the Concept of the U.S. Army’s Rangers, 1942-1983,” 292–93. 
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causalities, and were subsequently deactivated by General Ridgeway.32  In a trend that 
would repeatedly plague USSF, recruitment also suffered from conventional commanders 
who were unenthusiastic about losing their most talented and often most experienced 
personnel to an unknown “special unit.”  These officers went so far as to discourage 
volunteers and sabotage their transfer paperwork.33  To overcome these challenges, the 
Army Chief of Staff, published a directive to subordinate commanders directing them to 
eliminate all obstacles.34  With the bureaucratic issues solved, transfer rates slowly 
climbed as the organization grew to meet perceived operational demands.35   
1. The Lodge Act  
One event that offered USSF a recruitment boost was the Lodge-Philbin Act of 
1950.36  The Lodge-Philbin Act, commonly referred to as “the Lodge Act,” was a piece of 
legislation introduced by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. This law was based on Lodge’s 
understanding of the German and Russian ability to incorporate foreign units into their 
militaries during WWII.37  Lodge’s vision was to create a means of enlisting and 
mobilizing Europe’s Displaced People (DP) against the threat of communism and under 
the banner of a “Volunteer Freedom Corps” (VFC).38  The VFC concept later evolved into 
the Lodge Act and allowed an initial enlistment of 2,500 unmarried, foreign volunteers into 
the U.S. Army.39  In an attempt to rapidly boost personnel numbers the newly established 
USSF “allowed for over half the enlisted men to be Lodge Act recruits.”40    
 
32 James Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 
1956-1990, Kindle Edition (Philadelphia ; Oxford: Casemate Publishers, 2017). 
33 Stejskal, 380 of 3604. 
34 Stejskal, 380 of 3604. 
35 Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 105. 
36 Briscoe, 104. 
37 Charles H. Briscoe, “America’s Foreign Legionnaires: The Lodge Act Soldiers-Part I,” Veritas 5, no. 
1 (2005): 34. 
38 Briscoe, 34. 
39 Briscoe, 34. 
40 Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin, 330 of 3604. 
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Despite the positive idea of enlisting the displaced population in Europe against 
Communism, the Lodge Act program was not without obstacles. First, many of the DPs 
were required to undergo intense background investigations by the Army’s Counter 
Intelligence Corps (CIC).41 Due to the nature of the applicant’s arrival in Western Europe, 
investigations took a long time due to the difficulty in investigating an applicant who 
conducted “street work,” a common job for DP’s.42  The process was also prolonged by 
the inability of investigators to verify information from emigres who had lived behind the 
iron curtain. Moreover, because of the “red scare,” any association, or relative with links 
to communism were scrutinized, causing fewer candidates to arrive for initial training than 
anticipated.  
Another challenge to the Lodge Act was the prohibition of countries from which 
applicants could be recruited. Restrictions on recruiting in Austria, Belgium, France, The 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Germany limited the potential for the Lodge Act to attain 
its initial enlistment goals.43 Even when end strength for the Lodge Act increased to 12,500 
personnel, the goal would never be realized due to the recruiting restrictions of the 
program.  
The lack of established standards and processes through which Lodge Act Soldiers 
enlisted proved anther challenge with the program. Many Lodge Act Soldiers processed 
into the Army in diverse means and one group’s process was rarely the same as its 
predecessors.44  The lack of standards combined with the testing, background 
investigations, and registration of the Lodge Act Soldiers dismayed Senator Lodge who 
repeatedly complained to Army officials.45  
While the Lodge Act seemed like it would be a boost USSF recruitment of 
individuals who had language expertise, knowledge of local areas and customs, and a desire 
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to fight communism, it only officially produced 800 soldiers.46  Of these, only around 100 
went on to serve in USSF, a number highlighted by the 22 available for duty with USSF in 
the first few months after the establishment of 10th SFG.47  Even after another year of 
Lodge-Act recruitment effort, the total number in USSF in 1953 was only 33.48  This 
number does not highlight the appeal that USSF had to foreign emigres and literature on 
the Lodge Act often conflates all foreign volunteers with SF Lodge-Act recruits. Had the 
Lodge Act not been stymied by military bureaucracy, lack of command emphasis, and 
inefficiency, it would have given SF a large ready-made force of language proficient and 
cultural experts. Instead, USSF made gradual growth which enabled organizational 
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II. THE FIRST SFOD-A MODEL DURING THE 
BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR 
A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS  
1. The Political Environment 
The organizational design of the initial SFOD-A, like so many units, was heavily 
influenced by its environment. This environment included political and social fear of the 
global specter of communism, the economics of a post-WWII U.S., and the historically 
unique technological circumstance of the nuclear age. The combination of these factors led 
to a demand for a unique force that was capable of using native populations to serve as 
force multipliers to deter or combat communist expansion. The result was the birth of USSF 
and its initial mission of UW. The SFOD-A, USSF’s sole tactical level unit, was 
specifically designed to meet the requirements of UW tasks to accomplish this mission.  
USSF arrived in a political environment dominated by the U.S. policy of 
communist containment. While the Truman administration had naively attempted to turn a 
blind eye to the communists’ intent, George Kennan’s 1947 publication, The Sources of 
Soviet Conduct, detailed communist expansionist ideology.49  Moreover, in Kennan’s 
publication, he outlined a containment policy which the U.S. implemented in National 
Security Council (NSC) 68.50  Secretary of State Dean Acheson first voiced President 
Truman’s policy of containment publicly on 12 January 1950. In this address, Acheson 
stated that U.S. containment would rely on air and naval supremacy, using the western 
Pacific island chain as a line of demarcation.51  However, rather than having a deterrence 
effect on communist expansion, this decision emboldened Stalin who gave the North 
Korean dictator, Kim Il Sung, approval to launch an invasion of South Korea in June 1950. 
President Truman, faced with the reality of Asia falling to communism, broke from his 
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island chain strategy and ordered the deployment of U.S. troops to Korea commanded of 
General MacArthur and with the approval of the U.N.52   
While MacArthur gathered his forces in Japan, the defeat of rapidly deployed and 
unprepared U.N. forces caused their retreat toward the Southeastern port city of Pusan. The 
initial problems of the war occurred partially because the piecemeal manner in which U.N. 
forces were deployed but also because of inter-war budget cuts and a general lack of 
contingency planning.53  This strategic failure stemmed from U.S. political sensitivity to 
confront Soviet interests following WWII which created inner-service bureaucratic 
problems.54  For instance, during the inter-war period, the U.S. had predominantly 
deployed non-combat units to South Korea in ad hoc, constantly rotated units. These units 
focused on internal security and developing the Republic of Korea (ROK) military.55  
However, budget cuts effectively hamstrung their efforts and denied the ROK an effective 
U.S. sponsored defense. Meanwhile, the Soviets created a communist North Korean 
government equipped with effective population control, robust propaganda, and a 
modernized military. As the capability of the North Koreans grew, the Soviets withdrew 
the bulk of their forces to the point that prior to the onset of hostilities, only a small 
contingent of advisors remained in place. By doing this, the Soviets maintained deniability 
of direct involvement in North Korea’s offensive actions.56  This provided a clear indicator 
of the prospect of proxy forces to enable strategic decisions which undoubtedly had an 
effect on U.S. decision makers when considering the development of USSF.  
MacArthur’s invasion and initial success penetrating North Korea, unintentionally 
brought the Chinese into the war and drove U.N. forces from the banks of the Yalu back to 
the 39th parallel. As the war ground into a stalemate, U.S. leaders began to experiment 
with non-typical units to enable effects to break the deadlock. Some of these non-
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conventional options can be considered Special Operations because they were conducted 
by specialized units with a specific mission orientation. These efforts included actions by 
U.S. Army Rangers during their brief reactivation to conduct raids and harass enemy 
supply lines.57  However, lack of strategic application of these forces by their conventional 
commanders resulted in high causalities with minimal positive effect.  Additionally, the 
8th Army developed a concept for a partisan unit of pro-democratic North Koreans. 
However, initial attempts to deploy members of the partisan unit to conduct UW behind 
enemy lines resulted in disaster due to the communist’s detailed population control 
measures and the lack of prior preparation by the U.S. and ROK.58  As a consequence, the 
partisan units were largely relegated to raiding operations along the North Korean coast.  
2. Social Change 
The weeks preceding the Korean War were perhaps some of the most hopeful in 
U.S. history as a sense of normalcy had settled in following the tumultuous years of WWII. 
In a national poll, newspaper editors were asked to respond with what news they believed 
the American people would most like to see. The highest responses were that the “Stalinist 
dictatorship had collapsed” and that “war had permanently been abolished.”59  The utopian 
atmosphere of stability imploded with word of the North Korean invasion and the 
population grimly accepted President Truman’s decision to deploy the military into what 
many assumed was the first theater of World War III. However, unlike the Vietnam War a 
decade later, the vast majority of the U.S. population believed the U.S. involvement in 
Korea was justified. This sentiment remained throughout the war despite the cost of 34,000 
U.S. personnel who died fighting.60  Therefore, instead of focusing on the human cost, the 
true national fear of the nation was that military weakness had inspired the communist 
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aggression and resulted in the perceived decline of U.S. hegemony.61  The stalemate fueled 
public perception that the might of the U.S. had faltered due to a lack of strong military 
leadership and President Eisenhower was elected in part due to his previous military 
leadership combined with his knowledge of “how to bring the Korean conflict to an early 
honorable end.”62  In other words, while the population wanted to end the Korean War, 
the perceived need for U.S. strength outweighed the demand. This resulted in relatively 
few adaptations within the military.  
3. The Economic Environment 
Military investment at the start of the Cold War was heavily influenced by 
congressional leaders who wanted to reduce the national deficit accrued during WWII. As 
General Omar Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted in his 1949 
congressional testimony, “we realize…that our nation’s economy under existing conditions 
can only afford a limited amount for defense.”63  This sense of fiscal responsibility 
occupied the minds of senior military and governmental leaders up to and at the outbreak 
of the Korean War. As a consequence, the military was neither postured to contain nor 
defeat communist offensive operations.  
The stalemate of the Korean War brought to light important lessons for both U.S. 
and Soviet decision makers about the costs and strategies for great power competition 
during the Cold War. For the Soviets, it demonstrated that the U.S. was willing to risk 
escalation to counter overt communist advances. It also demonstrated that the U.S. could 
be baited into costly wars that would accrue an intolerable monetary cost leading to 
defeat.64   
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4. Technological Change 
By far the greatest technological advancement of the period came with the growth 
of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and it increasingly became a preferred method of deterrence. 
The Soviet atomic test, resultant arms race deepened attachment to this method through 
“mutually assured destruction.”  This policy came to be a cornerstone of defense for every 
administration that followed President Truman and President Eisenhower was no 
exception. Whereas President Truman had responded conventionally to communist 
operations, President Eisenhower, realized that conventional operations’ costs had the 
potential to bankrupt the treasury. Consequently, President Eisenhower’s foreign policy, 
which was called “The New Look,” downplayed conventional deterrence and relied 
heavily upon the nuclear option to provide “massive retaliation.”  As noted by Kenneth 
Osgood, Eisenhower’s “experience, combined with the awesome destructive power of 
nuclear weapons, convinced [him] that general war should be avoided at all costs.”65  To 
this end, outside of “massive retaliation,” the chief tenet of the “New Look” policy was to 
enable the “free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and 
means of its own choosing” through advisory missions.”66  “The New Look” policy forced 
the military to downsize its land and naval conventional capability while increasing its 
aerial atomic and Special Operations capability, particularly psychological warfare.67  For 
USSF, this policy represented a “boom” in funding and, as will be discussed, precipitated 
mission growth and organizational adaptation. 
B. MISSION AND TASKS 
While all organizational capability adaptations of the SFOD-A have been heavily 
influenced by the environment of the time, the initial model was also heavily influenced 
by internal military politics. As noted, the suspension of Army Ranger units provided USSF 
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with the necessary personnel slots to facilitate the manning of the new force. The 
deactivation of the Army Ranger units also demonstrated the pervasive belief by military 
leaders that the elite capability of the Rangers could be developed quickly in an emergency 
and required no peacetime units.68  In contrast, the OCPW staff realized that UW 
operations were longer in duration requiring preparation during peacetime for wartime 
employment. Accordingly, USSF initially remained hyper-focused on its mission of UW 
to ensure there was no misconception and consequent misuse as a commando force by the 
conventional army. USSF’s operating concept was ubiquitous throughout the early years 
and transcended all ranks. As noted by Sergeant First Class Dick Shevchenko “our mission 
was to go behind enemy lines, gather up guerrillas, and train them.”69 
When Colonel Bank took command of the first USSF unit, the 10th SFG, the 
OCPW staff was still diligently developing a model for the force’s employment into 
various theaters of operation. While the Korean War provided a short-term option, its 
conventional nature provided few opportunities for USSF to prepare the environment for 
UW operations. Consequently, the OCPW staff focused their initial organizational design 
on employment in the European Theater. As the staff had various backgrounds and 
experience in UW, there was some debate on which European WWII model the unit should 
follow and each staff member advocated primarily based on their individual experience.70  
In the end, the OCPW staff settled on the OSS Jedburgh concept as the capability model 
and the OGs as the size model for the SFOD-A.71  
C. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES 
As individuals transferred to the 10th SFG at Fort Bragg, the work of organizing 
subordinate units began to take shape. The initial naming construct was borrowed from the 
Jedburgh model of “Functional Area Teams” or FA Teams and was adapted for each 
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echelon of command within 10th SFG. For instance, the tactical level unit kept the FA 
designation while the company and battalion level units were referred to as Functional B 
(FB) and Functional C (FC) Teams, respectively. According to the unit’s Table of 
Organization and Equipment (TO&E) dated 1952, the 10th SFG consisted of a 
Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) and three Special Forces Battalions or 
FCs. Each FC had five companies (FBs) and each FB had 10 FAs (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. 10th SFG organizational chart.72 
The responsibility for each echelon of command was broken up according to the 
level of guerilla unit that was being advised. For instance, the FA Teams were responsible 
for training a company size guerilla force and FB Teams were responsible for training a 
 
72 Eugene G. Piasecki, "The A-Team Numbering System," Veritas 5, no. 4 (n.d.): 39; Piasecki, “The 
Psywar Center Part II: Creation of the 10th Special Forces Group,” 110. 
20 
battalion level unit. Meanwhile, the FCs provided logistics while the SFG Headquarters 
was responsible for the development of a guerilla area command.73   
As the organization of the SFG took shape, the manning of each respective unit 
began to evolve. For FA teams, the predecessor of the SFOD-A, the first manning attempt 
mirrored the OSS OG model and consisted of 15-man teams (two officers and 13 
enlisted).74  SFG leaders though feared that the size too closely mirrored that of a Ranger 
section which could precipitate misuse. The size was therefore adjusted to a 12-man 
team.75  Like their Detachment 101 and OG progenitors, each team was capable of splitting 
into smaller elements based on the environment they were operating within.76   
Individual capabilities known as Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) within 
the FA Teams was an evolving concept. Colonel Bank’s experiences in occupied France 
shaped the initial FA teams’ specialties and, like their WWII predecessors, every team 
would cross-train in mission required skills. The two most concrete specialties in Colonel 
Bank’s vision were the medics and the radio operators.77  As the training was further 
refined for the expected operating environment, communication and medical skills were 
added to enable operations deep inside enemy zones of occupation. Later, capabilities such 
as weapons, demolitions, survival, and tactics were taught to all personnel on the FA 
teams.78  
Initially, there was no established school for the USSF training. Nevertheless, the 
leadership and staff of the new 10th SFG, worked to establish an initial training regimen 
worthy of the new unit and its mission. Training in Guerrilla Warfare was facilitated by the 
Army’s Psychological Warfare Department and individuals received an initial 8-week 
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course on basic partisan warfare.79  Special considerations for officers and enlisted who 
could not attend the course forced 10th SFG to create an internal individual skills program 
which supplemented the 8-week course.80  
Individual MOS training followed the Guerrilla course, which prepared each 
member of the FA team in his skill. Although Colonel Bank’s opinion of specialty skills 
consisted of medical and radio expertise; the SF hopefuls trained many of the skills learned 
and used by Allied forces during WWII. These added capabilities such as small unit tactics 
and intelligence gathering operations enabled the activities of the new unit.81  Outside of 
collective training. Select individuals also received additional training to enable the 
insertion of teams behind enemy lines. This training included, rough terrain parachute 
insertion, provided by a smokejumper school in Montana, and waterborne insertion, 
provided by a small-boat operators course in Virginia.82   
Despite the novelty of the initial training the new USSF recruits received, their 
skills were watchfully and carefully evaluated to ensure the strictest professionalism and 
standards were enforced. Assessment of the new skills of the SFG fell to the training staff 
of unit’s headquarters and the SFG Operations Officer developed evaluations for FA, FB, 
and FC teams. Field Training Exercises such as FREE LEGION and LEGIONNAIRE 
RALLY tested the newly trained teams’ individual and collective skills.83  Colonel Bank 
was ever-present during these evaluations and often opted to personally talk to a team to 
ensure they understood the demands of their respective missions during a UW operation.84  
The initial training regimen culminated in an evaluation of the entire SFG during FTX 
CLEO held at Camp Castro in the Chattahoochee National Forest.85  Upon completion, 
10th SFG was certified and prepared to conduct its UW mission.  
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Shortly after 10th SFG’s certification, President Eisenhower ordered its 
deployment to Germany. This deployment was based on several events which coincided to 
create a ripe atmosphere for a UW operation. Following the death of Joseph Stalin in March 
of 1953, U.S. leaders sensed a feeling of change within the Soviet Union and sought 
opportunities to exploit the transition.86  This sense of vulnerability also reached the 
German population living under Soviet oppression who rose in riotous revolt against their 
communist oppressors. Though discounted by the Soviets and communist German 
Democratic Republic as minor and fractured, the labor strikes and nation-wide rebellion 
constituted roughly ten percent of the population.87  President Eisenhower, sensing an 
opportunity to create wider rebellion at low political and economic cost, ordered the 
deployment of the 10th SFG. 
Upon arrival to Germany, the 10th SFG represented a trained and certified UW 
force capable of meeting the President’s desired goal. However, officers at United States 
Army Europe command were unable to include the unit into theater plans.88  Consequently, 
although certified in UW and deployed to take advantage of the East German uprising, the 
10th SFG was sidelined while the Soviets crushed the insurrection with tank armies. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Despite significant lobbying effort by the OCPW to establish a UW unit, it was 
changes in the environment, particularly the financial and human costs of conventional 
deterrence in Korea, that drove U.S. leaders toward alternative means of combatting 
communist expansion. While USSF was created, organizationally designed and deployed 
with the required capability to conduct UW in Europe, the inability of military leaders to 
see the significance of left it struggling for relevancy. As a consequence, USSF adapted its 
capability toward other missions that supported the global defense against communist 
aggression.  
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III. MODEL II: VIETNAM AND THE WARS OF LIBERATION 
A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The first model focused on the environment and missions which demanded the 
capabilities required by the initial SFOD-A and determined its organizational design. The  
second model focuses on the environment and adaptations that USSF undertook as it was 
sidelined from strategic employment in Europe and instead found work in Southeast Asia. 
Like the first model, the capabilities of the SFOD-A remained heavily influenced by the 
environment and missions of the regiment as it transitioned focus to the Pacific. This model 
demonstrates USSF’s adaptation from a specialized niche force to one capable of 
conducting full spectrum Special Operations.  
1. The Political Environment 
The political environment influenced changes in missions and the organization of 
SFOD-As during the lead up to and execution of the Vietnam War. A major contributing 
factor of this was the U.S. policy of containment which was carried by every President 
during the Cold War. While the initial containment policy focused on reacting 
conventionally to communist offensives, the policies of President Eisenhower and 
Kennedy focused on enabling defense by enabling partner nations’ efforts. To meet this 
strategic goal, the U.S. military increased advisory missions as a means of furthering 
partner nation defense efforts. While USSF in Europe seemed to fade out of utility, new 
USSF units formed to meet the demand.  
Although USSF was still held in dubious regard by many high-ranking military 
leaders, the ability of the newly formed USSF units to expound upon their original mission 
highlighted the units as flexible alternatives to large footprint conventional forces. The 
adaptability of these units for various Special Operations missions meshed well within 
President Eisenhower and Kennedy’s respective strategies and gained USSF relevancy.89  
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Moreover, the rapid transition from its core mission task of UW left an indelible mark on 
the culture of USSF which is still evident today.  
The mid to late 1950s saw much change to U.S. national foreign policy regarding 
what some called the “Wars of National Liberation and Liberation Fronts.”90  As policy 
demanded smaller force sizes to save fiscal and manpower cost, advisory missions for 
USSF grew. The initial name for these missions were Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and 
they became a common mission for USSF in Asia. The MTT mission in Vietnam began 
under President Eisenhower in 1957 and rapidly gained additional authorities as the 
security situation in that country deteriorated and economy-of-force operations 
expanded.91  
Another environmental challenge for USSF units in Vietnam came from the after-
effects of the Korean War stalemate. As noted by Andrew Krepinevich, many senior U.S. 
Army leaders accustomed to winning conflicts, like WWI and WWII, “adopted a never 
again” attitude toward the limited objectives imposed on them by the civilian leadership 
during the Korean War.92  This sense of limiting was felt within the public and political 
arenas and was echoed in Presidential policy.93  However, without a strategy which 
matched means and ends, the U.S. population and military were largely unprepared for the 
requirements of winning an “irregular war.”  
Correspondingly, France’s post-WWII delay of decolonialization and 
independence of Asian states created an environment primed for the spread of communist 
ideology. Even when forced through U.S. and international pressure, France’s effort in 
assisting the transition of several of its Southeast Asian colonies failed, and U.S. support 
was increasingly required.94  Guided by the domino theory, which demanded the defense 
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of every state from communist aggression, the U.S. began to increase its support to 
vulnerable governments throughout the world. As noted, this necessitated the deployment 
of SFOD-As to serve as MTTs providing the training, advisement, and equipping of 
forces.95  While training conventional forces was not a prevailing concept of employment 
at USSF’s inception, the professionalism and training of the SFOD-As made them the force 
of choice for OPERATION WHITESTAR. The purpose of OPERATION WHITESTAR 
was to create “shock forces” to combat communist insurgents through Direct Action (DA) 
strikes.96  While USSF MTT missions were largely successful, U.S. Army senior 
leadership felt that USSF was too independent and later cancelled the program.97  Despite 
the cancellation of WHITESTAR, SFOD-As gained valuable skills and experience which 
were carried over during the Vietnam War.  
A substantial increase in strength and employment for USSF came following the 
election of President Kennedy whose departure from the concept of “massive retaliation” 
espoused by President Eisenhower made USSF the premiere force for his foreign policy. 
Adding emphasis to President Kennedy’s point was the best-selling 1959 book Uncertain 
Trumpets by General Maxwell Taylor which concluded that “massive retaliation limited 
U.S. options to nuclear deterrence.”98  Instead of continuing the massive retaliation policy, 
President Kennedy developed the “Flexible Response” policy which gave the U.S. 
deterrence options at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels by rebuilding and 
refocusing the military.  
President Kennedy’s early view of warfare was fueled by his understanding of the 
growth of communist “Wars of Liberation.”  As noted in his speech to the graduating class 
of West Point on June 6, 1962: 
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Korea has not been the only battleground since the end of the Second World 
War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in 
Algeria and Cuba and Cyprus, and almost continuously on the Indo-Chinese 
Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear 
retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new 
in its intensity, ancient in its origin -- war by guerrillas, subversives, 
insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, 
instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy 
instead of engaging him.99 
USSF’s subsequent adoption of counterinsurgency (COIN) into its core mission 
tasks gained traction as President Kennedy’s refocus on the military intensified. At this 
point, USSF had already executed several MTTs in Southeast Asia. Like OPERATION 
WHITESTAR, USSF was again the force of choice for the military’s initial effort in 
Vietnam. 
As security in Europe stabilized with tank armies facing off with one another along 
the East-West German border, the U.S. began to increasingly focus on the Pacific.  Linked 
to this shift was the pervasive belief by U.S. leaders that the European powers should 
decolonize the region and permit the indigenous populations the right of self-
determination. This concept was problematic though as noted by the European leaders who 
believed the U.S. “failed to recognize that the continuation of colonial rule, or at least 
influence, was the only thing preventing the emergence of states hostile to the West.”100  
Undeterred, the U.S. continued to pressure the Europeans to decolonize while indigenous 
communist nationalists began violent revolts.  
In Vietnam, colonial grievances led to The First Indochina War as France struggled 
against communist forces desiring to free Vietnam from its unwanted host. U.S. leaders 
had, in accordance with the containment policy, offered assistance to the struggling French 
with the provision that France allow the Vietnamese the right to self-determination. 
However, colonial interests prevailed and the French, unwilling to accept U.S. 
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preconditioned support, began to lose the war. While the U.S. ultimately acquiesced and 
provided materiel aid, the decision came too late to change the outcome and the French 
suffered a major defeat at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1953 and consequently lost Vietnam.101 
The Geneva Accords of 1954, which the U.S. helped organize, finalized the 
conclusion of the First Indochina War and split Vietnam along the 17th parallel. Fearing 
the vulnerability of the neighboring of Laos and Cambodia, U.S. leaders determined that 
“any further territorial loss to Communist expansion in SE Asia was inevitable unless a 
regional defense alliance under U.S. leadership could be established.102  With President 
Eisenhower’s approval, the U.S. created a plan for an America-led security framework for 
the region which included nations such as the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines.103  This security framework, took its 
design from the NATO construct and included provisions for collective defense between 
all signatories.104  Although many were happy with the defense pact, it did not take long 
for U.S. leaders to realize that “they were not dealing with a mirror image of the security 
situation in Europe” and that additional U.S. forces would be required to maintain regional 
stability.105 
2. Social Change 
Much of the U.S. population initially supported Presidents Eisenhower and 
Kennedy’s policies in Vietnam. The relatively few numbers of troops deployed to the 
country under the MTT concept, left the greater U.S. population relatively unaffected by 
the military support. This ignorance resulted in very little societal change throughout the 
initial years of U.S. deployments. However, President Johnson’s 1965 decision to escalate 
U.S. involvement began to generate profound societal change. As noted by Lunch and 
Sperlich, from 1966–1967 “increasing numbers of people began to tell pollsters that 
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American involvement in the Vietnam War was a mistake.”106  This downward trend of 
American public sentiment strained the relationship between the policymakers and the 
military. Moreover, the loss of public support for the war generated additional restrictions 
on the means U.S. forces could use to execute operations in order to limit U.S. causalities. 
This resulted in U.S. military leaders’ continual attempts to bring the war to a swift close 
through large conventional operations. These efforts affected USSF’s mission focus and 
organizational requirements throughout the war.  
3. The Economic Environment 
While the cost of the Vietnam War in blood, drove rapid societal change at home, 
equally costly was the financial burden. Unlike the human cost, the full burden of financial 
capital was slowed by the incremental increases in the war but was nevertheless debilitating 
over time.107  While the initial buildup of the military for participation in the conflict 
generated an increase to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) the length of the war 
ultimately demanded increased spending.108  The combination of the government 
“blowout [of the] budget deficit” combined with “an expansionary monetary policy” led to 
a rise in inflation by the close of the war.109  This slow path toward recession produced 
little change during the war but had a long-term effect following its conclusion. 
4. Technological Change 
Adding to the complexities of the environment during this time period was a 
significant technological advancement; the helicopter. Born out of the inter-service rivalry 
between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army since its breakup after WWII, the helicopter 
gave rise to the concept of air-mobile units. This concept promised a variety of increased 
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capabilities including, a more flexible response force, faster reaction times, improved 
tactical mobility, increased early detection, a quicker counter-attack reserve, and a force 
“more likely to surprise and eradicate guerrilla forces.”110   
The first test of the air-mobile concept came by the Army’s first air-mobile unit, 
the 1st Cavalry Division. In this “test,” the 1st Cavalry Division was not only able to launch 
forces and artillery into an enemy stronghold but reinforce and resupply them all via 
helicopter.111  Recognizing that increased mobility enabled offensive operations, a U.S. 
advantage and concept it frequently gravitates toward, the U.S. military strategy throughout 
much of the war focused on area denial and clearance operations.112  In essence, military 
leaders saw air-mobility as the tool to break from the stalemate of the Korean War by 
enabling rapid movement into denied areas. As a consequence, conventional military units 
were often focused on clearance operations while USSF, being resupplied by air, could 
perform economy-of-force operations in rural areas.   
Another technological advancement which influenced events throughout the 
Vietnam War came in the form of news as it transitioned from paper reporting to television 
as a means to recount the war’s progress. In the advisory years of the Vietnam War (1954–
1961), media coverage of Vietnam or events in Southeast Asia rarely occurred.113  With 
little to spark the interest of the American public, journalists focused elsewhere for 
newsworthy events. Troop escalation and increase in combat casualties brought additional 
attention and televised news broadcasts focusing on the war increased.114 According to a 
Trilateral Commission of 1975, television journalism’s ability to quickly report on the news 
with graphic photographs or videos on the horrors of war represented a new source of 
 
110 “U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board Final Report, 20 August 1962. :: General 
Military History,” 14–15, accessed August 13, 2019, 
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll11/id/1689. 
111 Harold G. Moore, We Were Soldiers Once -and Young : Ia Drang, the Battle That Changed the War 
in Vietnam (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993). 
112 Russell Frank Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy 
and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977). 
113 Michael Mandelbaum, “Vietnam: The Television War,” Daedalus 111 (1982): 158. 
114 Mandelbaum, 159. 
30 
national power.115  This concept was reflected by Richard Nixon who stated, “news media 
had come to dominate domestic opinion about its purpose and conduct [of the war].”116  
This constant influence by the media increased resentment of the war, contributed to the 
lack of American public resolve, and fueled war protests effecting how the war was 
executed. 
B. MISSION AND TASKS (1950–1973) 
The aforementioned factors played a contributing role in the way the military 
executed their missions. As the environment shifted, the missions asked of USSF during 
Vietnam can be categorized under the four separate missions of COIN, Direct Action (DA), 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Special Reconnaissance (SR). Although the original 
mission of USSF was UW, the growth of communist backed insurgencies led to additional 
missions and demanded adaptation.117  While some units operating in Southeast Asia, such 
as the 14th Special Forces Operational Detachment, did include temporary missions to 
“seek out, train, and support men capable of becoming effective guerillas in Vietnam,” this 
mission paled in comparison to the larger programs under the conventional strategy 
employed in Vietnam.118 
As part of the larger COIN strategy in Southeast Asia, the U.S. Army initially 
employed MTTs and advisory groups to provide military assistance through equipment, 
training and combined operations.119  These programs spanned several countries including 
Thailand, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and Indonesia while necessitating the creation and rapid 
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deployment of the 1st SFG.120  Not only did the MTTs assist foreign governments by 
strengthening host-nation military capabilities, they also demonstrated that USSF was 
capable of operating alongside a multitude of foreign forces. This allowed detachments to 
engage within the culture of their host nation, a skill critical to any foreign interaction.121 
In Vietnam, USSF missions morphed over time as the U.S. military commitment to 
the security of the peninsula increased. By far, one of the longest enduring programs USSF 
participated in during the conflict was the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). The 
CIDG was a concept started by the CIA’s Military Assistance Advisory Group’s Combined 
Studies Division (CSD) to enable disaffected South Vietnamese rural peasants to defend 
their own areas while denying the communists safe haven. By design, this program 
received CIA funding but used USSF to recruit, train, and equip the locals.122  The concept 
was largely successful and effectively created friendly safe areas as a thorn in the side of 
the communists’ operations in South Vietnam.123  
The CIDG program marked a shift from the typical training or advisory missions 
of the same period. In essence, the program was more akin to the UW mission of USSF 
with slight modifications. Instead of going deep behind enemy lines, SFOD-As would be 
in a host nation’s “free territory” persuading local minority groups from joining the 
communists and enabling their own internal security. Selected as the first test village, the 
“Buon Enao Experiment” in Darlac province was solely under the control of the CSD and 
not the Vietnamese government.124 The basic concept of the CIDG program was to obtain 
approval from village chiefs and elders to adopt the program, swear allegiance to the 
Republic of Vietnam, and establish a security force and defensive structure in the 
village.125  After two-and-a-half months of work in Buon Enao, the initial experiment 
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concluded with such success that the provincial chief requested the program expand to 
neighboring villages.126 
Part of the success of the early CIDG program was that it belonged to the CIA 
which had fewer bureaucratic challenges when it came to organization, funding, and 
support for various civic projects than the military did.127  The result was an early success 
of the program and 1962 brought with it an increase in the CIDG program throughout 
Darlac Province. The program initially expanded to include 40 additional villages within a 
15 km radius of Buon Enao but by the end of the year, the program encompassed over 200 
villages.128  The increased activity brought with it a greater demand for SFOD-As which 
necessitated the creation of the Headquarters United States Army Special Forces Vietnam 
(USASFV).129  By the close of 1962, USSF had increased in strength to “530 USSF 
soldiers serving on four B-Teams and twenty-eight SFOD-As throughout Vietnam.130   
As USSF’s strength in Vietnam increased, the U.S. military in country reorganized 
into the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV). MACV’s leaders then pressured 
the CIA to pass control of the CIDG and USSF to the new command.131  After relenting, 
the CIA and MACV co-sponsored OPERATION SWITCHBACK to transfer complete 
control of the CIDG program to MACV.  This transfer changed several of the essential 
components of the program.132  First, instead of being a U.S. centric effort, the 
responsibility for the camps reverted to South Vietnamese control following the completion 
of training and the establishment of security. This led to lapses in support by the South 
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Vietnamese Government for the villages.133  Additionally, instead of a population centric 
approach focusing on minority groups, SWITCHBACK changed the focus of CIDG 
operations to a more offensive minded strategy.134  Instead of local area security, the CIDG 
began targeting communist infiltration routes into Vietnam.135  This demanded half of the 
security force from villages to at all times, be out on patrols actively seeking out the 
communists.136  
The new shift toward an offensive strategy under the COIN effort changed the 
mission for USSF in Vietnam. Several of these changes included: support for offensive 
operations of conventional forces with Apache Forces, the modification of the CIDG 
mission to include placing camps in contested areas along infiltration routes, and the 
creation of the MIKE force as a DA mobile strike force to conduct offensive operations 
against the enemy.  
Apache Forces were formed in response to ambushes of helicopter Landing Zones 
(LZs).137  To combat this threat, MACV ordered the USASFV to respond using indigenous 
forces to augment their operations. 5th SFG’s concept was simple; take ethnic Chinese 
anti-communist Nungs assigned to CIDG companies, provide them with advanced training 
and deploy them as 10-man reconnaissance units to scout LZs prior to large, air-mobile 
operations.138  Once the air-mobile unit was on the ground, the Apache Force fell under 
the incoming commander until completion of the operation. Although short lived, all the 
Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) developed this capability. The cost of these operations to the 
CIDG program was drastic as the indigenous force losses through attrition while working 
in unfamiliar terrain produced a negative response in future CIDG programs.  
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USSF and the CIDG program suffered additional losses as the focus of the 
military’s effort transitioned. Instead of providing local area security and civic projects for 
the villages the CIDG locations became bases for strike operations in their respective 
areas.139  To facilitate this shift, by late 1964, CIDG camps were moved along the borders 
of Laos and Cambodia. Once again, this meant that rather than focusing on the population, 
USSF expanded in regions where there was either no population or where the population 
was so primitive that they avoided all contact with “outsiders.”140  Left without a willing 
population from which to source the CIDG, the mayors of Danang and Hue provinces 
began to press teenage hoodlums into service. This led to a precipitous decline in the 
capability of USSF and the CIDG, which degraded the original concept.141   
As the communist insurgency gained momentum in South Vietnam, USSF and their 
CIDG counterparts isolation left them exceedingly vulnerable. Losses from several attacks 
from 1964–1965 at Ben Cat and other CIDG bases near the dangerous “iron triangle” 
demanded USSF create quick reaction forces capable of rapidly reinforcing besieged 
SFOD-As.142  To fulfill this requirement, MACV created the Mike Forces.  
Mike Forces, like their Apache Force and CIDG predecessors, recruited, trained, 
and equipped the indigenous population to augment USSF operations, in this case, Quick 
Reaction Forces (QRF). As the capability of these units grew, they became an invaluable 
asset as they were able to save numerous outposts that would have otherwise been overrun. 
Conventional force commanders began to see the Mike Forces as a rapidly deployable force 
that could be moved to hostile areas that were too risky for other South Vietnamese or U.S. 
conventional forces. This became the method of employment of the MIKE forces 
throughout the rest of the Vietnam war and allowed “USSF and their ‘stikers’ to 
aggressively seek out and destroy the enemy.”143  
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C. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES 
The missions for USSF evolved thought the Vietnam period, however the structure 
of the SFOD-A changed little; especially with regard to MOS capabilities. There were, 
however, several experiments that the 14th Special Forces Operational Detachment 
(SFOD) attempted in the late 1950s which included a 16-man detachment as a model for 
the SFOD-A. This unit was commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, the Executive officer 
was a Major, the Operations Officer was a Captain, and contained a Master Sergeant in 
charge of 12 senior Sergeants.144  All members of this unit had to apply and were 
thoroughly screened prior to execution of FID tasks throughout the Pacific. Under this 
model the 14th SFOD conducted several deployments to Thailand, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 
However, with the creation of 1st SFG, the members of this unit became the cadre for the 
new unit and the concept faded away as it was determined that FID missions, outside of 
combat, required no organizational adaptation of the SFOD-A.145 
The introduction of USSF into Vietnam and the development of the CIDG program 
initially required little organizational adaptation for the SFOD-A. While the pilot teams 
that made initial contact with village elders generally consisted of an USSF medic and CIA 
counterpart, the execution of the CIDG program was ultimately filled by SFOD-As.146  As 
USSF was short personnel, it was not uncommon for CIDG programs to be filled with 
incomplete SFOD-As. For example, in the experiment at Buon Enao the SFOD-A113 
medic and a CIA representative made initial contact prior to bringing the six remaining 
men of the detachment in (see Figure 3).147 
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Figure 3. The structure of the original SFOD-A tasked with the 
experimental CIDG mission148 
The success of the CIDG program and subsequent expansion necessitated 
additional SFOD-As and marked the first field adaption of its organizational structure. 
Through experimentation, it was determined that the ideal force structure for the CIDG 
program was a Vietnamese Special Forces unit and a SFOD-A operating as a split-team.149  
The focus of the U.S. personnel was to advise and assist the Vietnamese Special Forces to 
accomplish what the initial USSF teams had done in other locations.150  In practice, this 
concept was not always possible as some SFOD-As were not partnered with a Vietnamese 
Special Forces unit.151   
As the military increased its role in Vietnam, it expanded offensive operations and 
USSF followed suit. Unlike the CIDG program which initially focused on local security 
and remained small, the Mike Forces were more formalized into the military construct. 
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Generally comprised of 185 indigenous personnel, the Mike Forces were organized in a 
battalion with a headquarters, three companies, and a weapons platoon (see Figure 4). 
Similar to the CIDG program, the SFOD-A assigned to the Mike Force supervised 
recruiting and conducted training and advisory operations within the battalion.152 This 
model for the MIKE force proliferated throughout Vietnam as a means to actively pursue 
the enemy.  
 
Figure 4. The Mike Force Battalion Organization153 
As the MIKE force dominated the USSF effort in Vietnam, the CIDG program 
began to take a back seat because population centric programs did not mesh with the 
strategic means of prosecuting the war at that time. Driven by a precarious political 
environment which insisted on quantifiable metrics of success, the U.S. military focused 
on body counts and areas cleared instead of the previous population centric metrics. This 
lack of a singular focus prevented doctrinal acceptance of SFOD-A adaptation that had 
occurred during the height of the CIDG program. The most pervasive of these adaptations 
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had been the addition of two billets per SFOD-A to allow for an imbedded Civil Affairs 
(CA) specialist and a Psychological Operations (PSYOP) officer (see Figure 5).  
Figure 5. SFOD-A with Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations imbed154 
Experience gained from years of population engagement demonstrated the 
importance of having a full time CA and PSYOP personnel on the detachment. Stanton 
states that while the role of CA or PSYOP may not always be present on a detachment, it 
was however, “the primary duty of one man.”155 Within the CIDG camps, civic action 
programs focused on programs such as medical care, agriculture, and animal husbandry 
expertise but also focused on training local Vietnamese on the skills necessary to become 
self-sufficient.156 The additional slots for CA and PSYOP at the detachment level also 
changed the structure of the USSF battalions CA and PSYOP functions and combined them 
under the S-3 operations for renewed emphasis.157 The success of many of the early CIDG 
camps hinged on the fact that the civic action programs accompanied the security programs 
within the village. This established a “social contract” between the people, the SFOD-As 
154 Shelby L. Stanton, U.S. Army Special Forces A-Team Vietnam Combat Manual (Boulder, CO: 
Paladin Press, 1988), xiii; Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets, 154–55. 
155 Stanton, U.S. Army Special Forces A-Team Vietnam Combat Manual, 120. 
156 Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets, 151–53. 
157 Simpson III, 155. 
39 
and the government and turned large numbers of indigenous Vietnamese into local self-
supporting security forces.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The period encompassing the Vietnam War was unique for the relatively new USSF 
and required some capability adaptation and organizational modification of the SFOD-A. 
The vast diversity of the missions and the dynamic nature of the environment required 
several adjustments to USSF’s original construct. Although the changes USSF made were 
temporary in nature, those teams which incorporated CA and PSYOP in conjunction with 
their village defense program tended to be more successful.  
Recognizing that the character of warfare was changing, the U.S. initially sought to 
employ population-centric military capabilities under COIN which it did not possess. 
Because counterinsurgency is population based, a broad range of population-centric 
capabilities were required at the detachment level. The shift towards a more offensive 
attitude in operations post-SWITCHBACK shifted the objective of USSF’s presence away 
from the population. While strike operations are a necessary requirement, especially in a 
COIN environment, it can be viewed as the easy and measurable way to demonstrate 
success despite short-term gains. The popularity of the strike companies, and their 
proliferation, demonstrate continued attempts to fight offensively.   
The integrated capabilities at the detachment level under the CIDG program might 
be useful for the future environment where interconnectivity and other globalization factors 
will require a different kind of capability beyond those which USSF currently possesses. 
Whereas the temporary changes to USSF were ad-hoc at best, limited wars, where indirect 
actions dominate all aspects on the battlefield and beyond it, will require change in USSF 
structure to meet the demands placed on the detachment by the environment.  
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IV. BEYOND VIETNAM AND TO THE WAR OF TERROR 
A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
Military change, and especially organizational military change, in times of relative 
peace, is rarely, if ever a fast process. Instead, change within military bureaucracies often 
occurs over several decades and is broadly shaped by the environment of the time.158  This 
chapter scopes the history of the SFOD-A detachment construct from the U.S. departure of 
Vietnam to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). By doing this, one can understand how 
the shifting environment, in terms of political, technological, social, and economic change, 
drove missions, focus, and organizational adaptation of the SFOD-A. Given that USSF has 
undertaken a vast array of missions since Vietnam, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
categorize all of the regiment’s missions. Instead, this chapter will seek to highlight several 
missions which best characterized the efforts of USSF and drove organizational adaptation 
during the selected period.  
1. The Political Environment 
UW is by nature, a political decision. Consequently, USSF has, perhaps more than 
any other military organization, either contracted, adapted, or expanded depending upon 
presidential administrations’ desired means of combatting threats. Such has been the 
environment since Vietnam, as the national desire to distance the prestige of the country 
from the failures dictated defense strategy and funding. Shifts in strategy and funding 
affected the military as a whole after Vietnam but its consequences shocked the core of 
USSF. One important consequence was an ebb and flow of USSF’s appetite to conform 
and adapt to conventional military demands.159  This malleability is not relegated to the 
immediate post-Vietnam period but instead can be seen in the assignments of SFOD-As 
over the past four decades.  
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The first post-Vietnam defense strategy modification actually occurred while the 
U.S. was still embroiled in the conflict. Faced with an increasing anti-war movement, and 
growing national distaste for the draft, President Nixon abandoned the “two-and-one-half 
war” defense strategy (meaning the military must be prepared to fight two conventional 
wars and one irregular war simultaneously) and adopted the “one-and-a-half war” defense 
strategy.160  This departure meant that rather than supplying troops to defend allies and 
partners globally, the U.S. would provide materiel aid and economic support.161  For 
USSF, which, like the rest of the military, was suffering from weak leadership and 
numerous ethical scandals, the transition threatened the organization’s existence. While 
President Nixon’s implementation of this strategy was cut short by his resignation, 
President Ford not only kept the policy but also its authors who supervised implementation.  
For the military, the shift in strategy meant that while the U.S. was withdrawing 
from Vietnam, it would downsize the force.162  USSF’s contemptuous relationship with 
the conventional Army, due to its “absence from the cannon of strategic theory,” was 
consequently starved of funding.163  Conventional Army officers, seeing no future in the 
unique force, further dissuaded talented personnel from joining.164  By the late 1970s, the 
confluence of these two factors nearly put USSF out of business. Seeing the proverbial 
writing on the wall, “the vast majority of officers and non-commissioned officers with 
[USSF] experience and knowhow fled into retirement or the conventional army.”165  This 
exodus left USSF in a state of organizational paralysis and resulted in attempts to rebrand 
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the organization as a reconnaissance and direct-action force offering commanders 
enhanced but nevertheless conventional capability. As Mark Boyatt describes, “Special 
Forces became a very expensive (in rank and training) conventional force. The 
unconventional operations aspect [of USSF] remained only barely viable.”166 
President Carter’s foreign policy attempted to create a more peaceful global 
environment by creating détente with the Soviet Union while promoting human rights 
internationally. This led to bi-lateral talks with the Soviets focused on limiting the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons that became known as the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT) I and II. President Carter predicated the SALT talks upon the Soviet’s 
limiting their expansion. However, as the Soviets proved throughout the 1970s, the 
communists had no interest in restraint. Not wanting to repeat another Vietnam, President 
Carter shifted his defense policy to protect U.S. vital interests, specifically those in the 
Persian Gulf and Europe through conventional deterrence. This era of “limited goals” 
further constrained USSF’s role as there was “no taste among executive branch 
policymakers for anything like unconventional involvements by the military.”167 
The Reagan administration was in some ways a double-edged sword for USSF. On 
the one hand, the administration sought to roll back Soviet expansion, spoke openly about 
supporting anti-communist insurgencies, and increased funding for and the size of SOF 
units.168  On the other hand, the administration was mostly unable to penetrate the 
military’s “traditional close focus on the Soviet conventional threat in Europe.”169 
Moreover, the administration’s reluctance to support anti-communist insurgencies 
with troops limited its goals to supplying military aid. Left with a national policy that 
supported irregular warfare but military leadership and a political environment that did not, 
USSF throughout the 1980s concentrated on conforming into the conventional apparatus. 
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In many ways, USSF distanced itself from its core, mission of UW and instead focused on 
“raiding and deep reconnaissance for large conventional operations.”170  This is not to say 
that unconventional and irregular operations and training did not occur and succeed, 
particularly under the revamped MTT construct, but rather that the focus was based upon 
tactics most useful in conventional battle.171  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, remaining political interest in UW 
evaporated. Except for the Persian Gulf War, the predominance of U.S. military endeavors 
throughout the 1990s was in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. These 
operations, combined with sweeping budget cuts under the Clinton administration, should 
have necessitated a conventional military adaptation toward a lighter, more expeditionary 
force.172  However, once again, “conventional wisdom” prevailed and the military writ 
large remained focused on conventional warfare. This predominance of focus came to a 
climax in the days and weeks following the 9–11 attacks, as senior ranking military leaders 
recommended courses of action to President Bush that were conventional minded but 
politically unsuitable.173 
September 11, 2001 brought USSF and UW back in vogue because it “offered 
significant military advantages, emphasized partnerships to reduce U.S. causalities, and 
reduced international perception of the U.S. killing Muslims.”174  Moreover, the 
unprecedented speed with which SOF, particularly SFOD-As, were able to oust the Taliban 
elevated the participants to hero status and bolstered the administration’s political 
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standing.175  As a consequence, USSF emerged in 2002 from Afghanistan as triumphant 
victors and the vindicators of American sovereignty. This desire to “fight smart,” was 
replicated during the invasion of Iraq, and SFOD-As deployed en masse to conduct UW as 
well as a variety of other missions in support of the 2003 invasion.  
Following the defeat of the Iraqi military and subsequent “de-Baathification,” the 
situation in Iraq degraded into anarchy as rival insurgent groups battled for supremacy of 
the country. The chaos of Iraq and the associated increase in U.S. causalities represented a 
significant political risk for the Bush administration. As noted by Eichenberge, Stoll, and 
Lebo, President Bush’s approval rating dropped “about one percentage point for every 100 
deaths of American personnel in Iraq.”176  To overcome this, the military leadership 
abandoned longstanding precedent and began to report the ratio of U.S. deaths vs. 
insurgents killed. This framing of the deteriorating situation served to demonstrate 
“measures of success” and were designed to decrease the impact of individual 
servicemember deaths’ on the U.S. population.177  From 2004 until 2007, when General 
Petraeus took command of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNFI), the military, including 
USSF, conducted DA centric CT operations while continually providing the media with 
body-count statistics reminiscent of the Vietnam War. Operations in Afghanistan mirrored 
the DA focused approach as the Taliban insurgency gained momentum. 
2. Social Change  
Entertainment has affected military investment as artists depict hyperbolic 
examples of SOF as either rogues who have gone “full native” or counter-terrorists who 
can accomplish the impossible. While entertainment can be seen as a reflection of the 
society’s perception of SOF, it can also drive the military’s vision of itself at present and 
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what it should be in the future. Moreover, entertainment and war futurists have recently 
coincided in their predictions of future environments. As Sean McFate describes: 
“Washington’s visions of future war look like they came off a Hollywood set [and] come 
in three flavors: nihilists, patriots, and technophiles.”178  Nihilists predict future Mad-Max-
style dystopias, patriots predict environments where military strength wins the day, and 
technophiles predict a technology-driven future with sentient machines controlling 
warfare.179   All of these predictions miss the mark but have effectively driven strategy 
and investment in technology within the military.180  At times, the technological focus has 
left the military with a capability gap regarding population based operations in support of 
strategic goals. 
3. The Economic Environment 
As is the case with any unit, funding has always played a pivotal role in the 
organization of USSF. As previously noted, before the adoption of the Nunn-Cohen 
amendment, USSF was profoundly affected by disproportionate funding cuts compared to 
the conventional military. In the post-Vietnam environment, this also led to significant 
reductions in force, which “destroyed USSF operational readiness as effectively as 
grapeshot.”181  To overcome the perceived lack of value, USSF focused on becoming 
proficient at individual and collective tasks that fit into the greater construct of warfare as 
envisioned by the conventional military at the time. This was particularly true prior to the 
Nunn-Cohen amendment when USSF’s focus centered upon DA and SR operations in 
support of the AirLand Battle operating concept. 
4. Technological Change 
Without a doubt, the greatest technological change since the U.S. departure from 
Vietnam has been the proliferation of computers. While computers and technology 
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profoundly impacted the daily lives of the global population, in terms of the U.S. military, 
it gave rise to the concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). By “shifting the 
balance between offense and defense,” the RMA concept meshed well with the U.S. 
military’s propensity for offensive and conventional operations.182  This contributed to a 
belief within the military that technological superiority would ensure battlefield success 
and the DoD focused heavily on expensive technological innovations.183  As described by 
H.R. McMaster, the RMA “took a very technological approach to the very complex human 
and political problem of war.”184  Accordingly, the U.S. predominantly focused its 
modernization efforts in the 1990s on the tenets of the RMA: “precision strike and delivery, 
information warfare, dominant maneuver, and space (systems and/or operations).185 For 
USSF, this meant that while the conventional military focused on defeating conventional 
opponents, the non-conventional role for USSF expanded.  
The speed of news dissemination also contributed to the adaptation of USSF from 
its traditional role of UW. This growth was initially seen in the Vietnam War and, as noted, 
it had a huge impact on how that conflict was prosecuted. Following the Vietnam War, the 
media began to focus on terrorism as an emerging global trend of violence. Consequently, 
as terrorist attacks began to occur against the U.S. abroad as well as at home, American 
interest steadily grew. This is not to say that terrorism grew because of interest but rather 
that the growth of the media provided terrorists with a global audience and made 
terrorism’s impact larger than before. 
In the 1970s, the growth of terrorism generated particular attention during the Ford 
administration as the Soviets began to promote its use as a new form of proxy warfare.186  
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In May 1976, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld published a memo entitled “Terrorism” 
which highlighted the “concern within the Government over the difficult problem.”187  The 
high-profile Israeli rescue of hostages in Entebbe led to even greater interest in the military 
for Counterterrorism (CT) operations. For USSF, which was held in “precarious value” at 
the time, CT represented an opportunity for renewed relevancy.188   
By 1979, the military had gone from having no CT forces to several “full-time” 
units and even more “semi-pros” from across the services.189  The failed attempt to rescue 
American hostages held in Iran in 1980, and the subsequent Holloway  Commission 
Report, highlighted several deficiencies of SOF that contributed to the failure. As a 
consequence, Congress was primed to enact legislation to address the problems that had 
become rampant throughout SOF. President Reagan’s inauguration and his “peace through 
strength” foreign policy further set the conditions for sweeping change within the Defense 
Department.  
Despite the findings of the Holloway Commission, which highlighted service 
parochialism as a factor that led to the failure of the Iran-Hostage rescue mission, the 
military remained mostly unchanged in terms of support to SOF. However, failed and near-
failed operations as part of the U.S. invasion of Grenada grew political interest and 
necessitated further congressional inquiry.190  After conducting a two-year study, which 
included a review of SOF, Senators Goldwater and Nichols introduced legislation to end 
the rampant parochialism and force necessary jointness within the services.  
While the Goldwater-Nichols Act produced organizational change within the 
military, SOF remained subject to financial restriction dependent upon the service chiefs’ 
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vision for the force. Consequently, USSF continued to struggle for relevancy in the 
military’s new operational design: AirLand Battle. Seeing this, Senators Nunn and Cohen 
introduced legislation which created a four-star combatant command for all of SOF. 
“Additionally, the legislation created an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict 
within the National Security Council, and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF 
(the so-called ‘SOF checkbook’).”191  In 1987, Congress passed this legislation and for the 
first time protected USSF from funding and personnel cuts by giving SOF the same level 
of representation as other combatant commands.  
B. MISSION AND TASKS 
Since Vietnam, USSF has had a variety of missions ranging from elite commando 
operations to UW in support of national objectives. These missions, driven by the 
environmental factors, necessarily demanded capability adaptation within the SFOD-A. 
The variety of these missions though resulted in a force more capable of executing ad hoc 
capability adaptation while decreasing the potential long-term changes that would more 
specifically enable UW operations. 
With the departure of the U.S. military from Vietnam, “Pentagon service staffs 
declared acronyms such as COIN and UW to be ‘bad words.’”192  As a result of this lack 
of enthusiasm for traditional USSF operations, USSF sought new avenues to display 
relevance within the national defense apparatus.193  In the late 1970s, the growth of 
terrorism provided USSF with such an opportunity. For a time, some USSF units 
concentrated exclusively on conducting CT operations. This capability requirement was so 
prevalent that it even affected “Detachment Berlin,” the regiment’s most fully capable and 
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mission-focused UW element. The result was mission competition, meaning that USSF 
units began to give up training time to prepare for CT rather than UW.194 
With the realization of the need for a National CT unit, USSF seemed to policy 
makers to be the likely unit from which to create the force. Under the direction of General 
Edward Myer, Colonel Charlie Beckwith, an experienced USSF officer, began organizing 
an elite DA-focused unit.195  Colonel Mountel, the 5th SFG(A) commander at the time, 
was unimpressed with Beckwith’s vision and advocated for a parallel unit with a greater 
focus on SR and clandestine activities and owned by USSF.196  The unit Mountel created 
came to be known as “Blue Light,” and although it was only active for a short period of 
time the members went on to create what would later be called the Special Forces 
Advanced Reconnaissance Target Analysis and Exploitation Techniques Course 
(SFARTAETC), a course still active today.197 
Despite being effectively forced out as the national CT force, CT remained one of 
USSF doctrinal tasks but was no longer the focus mission. The military’s adoption of the 
AirLand Battle operating concept effectively refocused the Army toward high-intensity 
conflict. Left without political backing for UW or CT, USSF found itself increasingly 
willing to “play ball with the services” and throughout the 1980s, the regiment adopted 
mostly conventional missions such as DA and SR in support of the new AirLand Battle 
concept.198  
The AirLand Battle concept, was conceived by General Starry in 1977 but largely 
implemented in the 1980s and was formulated upon two assumptions. The first was that 
the Army could not withstand another protracted fight like the one in Vietnam.199  The 
second was that conventional war could be fought and won against the Soviets in Europe. 
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The latter of these assumptions was based on the Israeli Army’s ability to defeat Soviet-
style opponents during the Yom Kippur War by using advanced U.S. weapons.200  
Consequently, General Starry’s operating concept focused on defeating a Soviet invasion 
of Europe by concentrating on winning the first battle.201  This transition of thought from 
a protracted war to one of massive conventional battle left little room for typical USSF 
missions.  
During the Persian Gulf War, the AirLand Battle concept was put on display as 
conventional Army units produced one of the finest examples of a Jominian “battle of 
annihilation” in history. American citizens at home were, for the first time, awed by the 
accuracy of airstrikes through video images distributed by the military from the nose cones 
of guided bombs. Moreover, the technological capability gap between ground forces 
enabled victory in battle despite incidents where U.S. forces faced a numerically superior 
opponent.202  The consequence of the 100-hour-long blitzkrieg had an enduring effect on 
the minds of military theorists throughout the 1990s and, for many, confirmed the advent 
of a RMA.  
The Persian Gulf War both exemplified USSF’s capability to support AirLand 
Battle through conventional support to high-intensity operations such but also began a slow 
revival of USSF irregular warfare capability. As stated by General Tovo, “Special Forces 
conducted a wide range of missions during the Gulf War, with varying degrees of effect on 
the overall campaign. The majority of these activities fell into four broad categories: 
coalition support, combat search and rescue (CSAR), SR, and DA.”203  While three of the 
activities of CSAR, SR, and DA can widely be seen as a result of the 1980s focus within 
USSF, coalition support, can be seen as an activity more closely related to a traditional 
USSF task. This task ultimately necessitated the deployment of 109 Coalition Support 
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Teams (CST) from the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 5th SFG(A), to hold together what General 
Schwarzkopf considered his center of gravity: the coalition.204  While assigned in this role, 
USSF teams not only trained the pan-Arab force but also provided conventional 
commanders with “ground truth” of coalition force capabilities.205  The proliferation of 
coalition operations in support of U.N. mandates throughout the1990s repeatedly 
demanded USSF to perform this role.  
The reclamation of Kuwait and the defeat of the Iraqi military brought an end to 
Operation Desert Storm. However, with encouragement from the allied forces, Iraqi Shia 
and Kurdish populations rose up in revolt against Saddam Hussein.206  Although the Iraqi 
military was defeated, it was far from destroyed. Consequently, Saddam Hussein turned 
his military loose on the rebels who were hopelessly overmatched by Iraqi armor and 
continuously attacked by helicopter gunships. Faced with nightly broadcasts of Iraqi 
brutality, the Bush administration, with U.N. approval, acted to stop what was sure to 
become a genocide. Almost immediately, the U.S. began supplying aid via airdrops to the 
displaced Kurds in what would become the most massive aerial delivery of aid since the 
Berlin Airlift.207  Members of the 1st Battalion, 10th SFG(A), who had been deployed to 
Northern Iraq during the war to provide CSAR capability, were once again called upon. 
Beginning in April 1991, just one month after the Kurdish uprising, these members entered 
Northern Iraq, to meet with Kurdish leaders and to coordinate aerial aid.208  The 
demonstrated success of USSF to conduct this type of operation made it the “go-to” for 
Humanitarian Assistance (HA). operations throughout the 1990s.   
USSF deployments throughout the 1990s saw four-fold increases as the 
conventional Army struggled between budgetary constraints and the need to continue to 
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modernize the force.209  However, as noted, the prevailing strategic thought of the 1990s 
was dedicated to the RMA, which saw the technological edge demonstrated by U.S. forces 
in the Persian Gulf War as a vision for the future.210  This vision predicted that wars could 
be fought and won through the application of firepower from the air and sea onto land. In 
essence, and despite indications to the contrary, the military remained focused on high-
intensity warfare, effectively allowing USSF to play a more significant role in countering 
irregular threats as it was intended to do. 
By the close of the 1990s, the reputation of USSF had recovered from the Vietnam 
stigma and it was seen as the “go-to” force when strategic effects were required. This was 
demonstrated in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks when ”the shock of 9/11 failed to 
provoke originality or imagination” from conventional Army leadership.211  Faced with 
courses of action which emphasized kinetic strikes from afar with minimal to no “boots on 
the ground,” President Bush opted to use USSF and CIA teams to link up with Afghan 
tribesmen and provide intelligence for the approaching armada of airpower.212  For the 
first few months in Afghanistan, USSF was able to accomplish multiple goals including 
facilitating the union of many tribes against the Taliban, the removal of the oppressive 
regime from power, and providing limited humanitarian assistance. These activities 
enabled the creation of what would become the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (GIRoA).  
Although the U.S. removed the Taliban from power, the subsequent decades of 
fighting proved the insurgents’ capability to reform and regain momentum while attacking 
coalition forces and destabilizing the GIRoA. To combat this threat, USSF’s focus 
throughout the initial years of the conflict centered on DA raids with pro-GIRoA 
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militias.213  With pressure from the international community, these activities were later 
curtailed and replaced with efforts to build the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan 
National Police (ANP).214  However, the resurgence of the Taliban demonstrated that the 
enemy-focused strategy could not succeed and required that the U.S. and GIRoA 
concentrate on local security. While several programs were attempted, Village Stability 
Operations (VSO) eventually became the consummate operation for SFOD-As in 
Afghanistan.  
The VSO program was begun in 2009 and paired SFOD-As with local villages to 
capitalize on the Pashtunwali concept of arbakai or local militia.215  While this operation 
was similar in form to previous USSF efforts with pro-GIRoA militias, the difference was 
in focus. Rather than attacking the Taliban, VSO, like its Vietnam CIDG predecessor, 
concentrated its efforts on the population. This indirect approach to COIN fit in well with 
the 2007 joint COIN Field Manual and consequently received support from the military 
leadership. As the concept was refined, VSO maintained focused on four tenets of 
successful COIN operations: Shape, Hold, Build, and Expand.216  Although these 
operations varied in their ability to create stability and link villages back to the government 
in Kabul, the concept nonetheless consumed the predominance of USSF’s effort in 
Afghanistan from 2010–2014.  
The early success of USSF in Afghanistan boosted USSF’s credibility within the 
joint force, and many of the SFOD-As that participated in the invasion of Afghanistan were 
again called upon for the invasion of Iraq. As Linda Robinson notes, USSF “had led the 
conventional military to appreciate what they could do. Whereas they had been restricted 
to a small set of missions in the first Gulf War, General Tommy Franks, the Central 
Command four-star in charge of Operation Iraqi Freedom, was willing to entertain any 
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proposal they made.”217  In what would become the most massive deployment of Western 
SOF in history, SFOD-As conducted a “very broad” array of missions during the invasion 
of Iraq.218 Whether it was UW in Northern Iraq with the Kurds or DA and SR in Western 
Iraq to find and destroy SCUD launch sites, USSF time and again demonstrated its 
capability to execute tactical level operations with operational and strategic impacts.219   
While it took the Taliban years to develop an insurgency model in Afghanistan that 
could destabilize the country, the anarchic environment in Iraq following the invasion 
proved to be fertile ground for Sunni and Shia insurgent groups. The resultant civil war, 
combined with political risk for the Bush administration, necessitated USSF to take part in 
the enemy-centric COIN strategy. While USSF teams conducted a variety of missions 
throughout the country, perhaps the operation with the most significant long-term impact 
was the creation of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force (ICTF), which would eventually 
grow into the Division-sized Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS).  
As noted in David Witty’s seminal work on the history of the CTS, in December 
2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld mandated the creation of an Iraqi counterterrorism 
unit.220  USSF’s inherent ability to develop indigenous populations into fighting units and 
experience in (what had become) FID, made it the best candidate to execute the 
directive.221  Beginning in early 2004, USSF chose individuals from across religious 
groups, trained them in Jordan for 98 days, and returned them to Iraq to conduct combined 
CT operations with USSF.222  For a short time, USSF’s efforts to create an Iraqi 
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counterterrorism unit were broken into two disparate battalions: the ICTF battalion and the 
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). However, in May 2004, USSF was directed to combine 
these battalions under the First Iraqi Special Operations Brigade (ISOF). The combination 
of these units under one banner, as well as the integration of support and reconnaissance 
battalions, created a force capable of executing the find, fix, and finish tasks of the targeting 
cycle internally. The growth of ISOF necessitated a more significant concentration of 
USSF on a rotating basis to ensure the concept remained valid. The result has been the 
longest-enduring relationship between USSF and any foreign military unit and created one 
of the most successful Iraqi Security Force Organizations.223 
C. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES (1973-2019) 
The period from the close of the Vietnam War to the Global War on Terrorism has 
been marked by profound political, technological, and economic environmental change. 
This fluctuation of the environment combined with the persistent need for relevancy has, 
at times, created a pendulum effect of focus for USSF. For instance, at times, the force has 
focused on unilateral, direct operations in support of national or conventional military 
objective and at others focused on working “by, with, and through” partners and allies to 
achieve goals.224  This mission variation has produced some long-term organizational 
adaptation which has mostly centered on increasing detachment’s lethality. More 
commonly though, these changes have demanded ad hoc capability adaptation as dictated 
by the mission and environment.  
Perhaps the greatest lethality adaptation which has occurred within the SFOD-A 
was the creation of the SFOD-A internal Special Operation Tactical Air Controller 
(SOTAC). Although USSF has always maintained the ability to call in airstrikes, advanced 
education in precision bombing provided by airpower experts was identified as a need 
within the SFOD-A during the invasion of Afghanistan. As noted by Dan Schilling, SFOD-
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A 595 (one of the initial teams into Afghanistan) self-recognized that “they were ‘yard-
saleing’ bombs all over the place” and requested support.225  To fill the gap in capability, 
USSF in Afghanistan requested Air Force Joint Terminal Air Controllers (JTAC).226  
However, the increased demand for SFOD-As within the GWOT combined with the 
precision strike capability offered by manned and unmanned air support outpaced the Air 
Force’s ability to provide qualified JTACs.227  This necessitated the development of an 
additional skill within the SFOD-A.  
Almost immediately after the first troops returned from operations in Afghanistan, 
USSF developed a program to build a Special Operations Tactical Air Controller (SOTAC) 
with JTAC capability and authority. In the fall of 2002, a pilot program was run at Ft. 
Bragg and was incorporated into the USSF Warrant Officer Basic Course.228  After the 
concept was validated, it became operational and ran the first SOTAC course in December 
2002.229  Between 2002 and 2017, the SOTAC program produced more than 500 graduates 
and drove requirements for SFOD-As to maintain two qualified SOTAC’s at all times.230 
Similar to the SOTAC course, the Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course 
was initiated by General Boykin, who saw the necessity for urban combat training during 
his deployment to Somalia.231  This program was then disseminated throughout the active 
duty groups to increase collective DA skills in an urban environment. In 1999, leaders 
within the 7th SFG(A), saw the predictions of population growth and urbanization as 
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indicators of future metropolitan conflict and redoubled efforts in SFAUCC training.232  
To prepare their SFOD-As, 7th SFG(A) leaders honed the program to include “34 hours of 
combat marksmanship, 60 hours advanced urban combat, and 26 hours of general subjects” 
training.233  By the Spring of 2000, the revamped SFAUCC graduated ten 7th SFG(A) 
SFOD-As and the concept was again disseminated throughout the regiment.234  This 
course was undeniably prescient in its creation and lifesaving on the battlefields of Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  
While ad hoc changes are as diverse as the missions that USSF has conducted, there 
are several worth mentioning because they highlight internal organizational adaptability. 
Moreover, some of these changes demonstrate the need for a scaled version of a SFOD-As 
while others highlight the need for additional external capability. In either of these cases, 
what is telling is that the variety of missions has resulted in an inability to specialize SFOD-
As to conduct UW operations.  
In terms of scaling up the size of an SFOD-A, the best example is that of Project 
Blue Light which combined five SFOD-As into one company-sized organization with a 
CT mission.235  Just a decade and a half later, SFOD-As conducting SR in the deserts of 
Iraq and Kuwait justifiable scaled their organizations down to decrease detection risk and 
increase coverage area.236  While splitting teams is doctrinally supported and the primary 
reason for duplication within the SFOD-A, joining teams is doctrinally and culturally 
unsupported. Moreover, while these adaptations demonstrate the individual flexibility of 
USSF Soldiers, they fail to demonstrate a true organizational adaptation because they 
offered more or less of the same capability. 
While SFOD-A size has been adjusted dependent upon the demand of the mission 
at hand, SFOD-As have also proven adept at requesting and incorporating external enablers 
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to cover capability gaps. For example, during the VSO operations in Afghanistan, many 
SFOD-As requested embedded Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and CA 
Teams. These additional teams increased detachment’s ability to leverage gains within the 
rural villages of Afghanistan and link them back to the government in Kabul. However, 
unlike their CIDG predecessor, the VSO operating concept never codified the best practices 
for the organization of the SFOD-A with enablers. Consequently, some SFOD-As VSO 
programs were inundated with enablers while others opted for a more minimalist approach. 
D. CONCLUSION 
From the close of the Vietnam War to the Global War on Terrorism, USSF has 
conducted a myriad of missions and executed countless ad hoc organizational changes. 
These changes have been executed as a result of the missions assigned and the environment 
in which they occurred. The results of a wide variety of missions has enabled USSF to gain 
and maintain relevancy. Reciprocally though, it has also denied long-term organizational 
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V. THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT 
A. A SHIFT IN PRIORITY 
In the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy (NDS), the Trump administration identified great power competition, particularly 
the growing threats of Russia and China, as primary security concerns for the United States. 
As demonstrated by recent defense investments, it is clear the U.S. is attempting to counter 
these threats and others through technological superiority.237  This “third offset strategy,” 
a term popularized by former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, seeks to create a 
technological capability gap so large that it serves as a deterrent against aggressive peer 
and near peer state actors.238  The problem, as demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, 
Crimea, etc, is that technological superiority does little to dissuade states from employing 
asymmetric or unconventional operations to combat U.S. interests below the threshold of 
conventional response.  
In his 1948 memorandum, George Kennan highlighted the ability of great powers 
to use “all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national 
objectives.”239  This “political warfare” as Kennan described it, enables nations to advance 
their strategic objectives through overt and covert actions while mitigating the risk of direct 
military confrontation. Kennan was not alone in seeing the necessity of options to project 
national power outside of conventional military confrontation. In 1952, General Robert 
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McClure and Lieutenant Colonels Aaron Bank and Russel Volkmann founded the U.S. 
Army Special Forces (USSF).240  For these men, the ability to support resistance and 
insurgent groups to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or an occupying power was 
critical to U.S. defense.241  These actions which would later be codified under the term 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) were USSF’s raison d’etre. Today, USSF remains the only 
organization in the U.S. military specifically designed to conduct these types of operations.  
Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and the USSR conducted UW operations 
against one another’s interests.242  As the current geopolitical environment returns to a 
cold war atmosphere, it is unsurprising that our competitors are once again executing UW 
operations. In fact, as Frank Hoffman argues, U.S. conventional overmatch has 
incentivized these types of operations.243  This is also indicative of a change of 
environment which has seen a decrease in the usefulness of the “weight of numbers and 
advanced weaponry.”244  It is therefore paramount that USSF remains prepared and 
organized to conduct or combat UW operations with increased frequency. If we do not, 
then we risk the fate of French leaders at the outbreak of World War II whose minds had 
become too “inelastic” to realize changes that had occurred to the character of warfare.245   
To maximize USSF’s competitive advantage to conduct UW operations, it must be 
organizationally tailored for its operational environment. Preparing for the current 
environment in an era characterized by rapid change is tantamount to preparing for the last 
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war. Instead, USSF must be organizationally aimed to succeed in the next 10–20 years. 
This requires an analysis of current global trends and peer activities that will likely play 
large parts in determining the future environment. It also requires an analysis of previous 
USSF adaptations to ensure that mistakes of the past are not replicated in the future.  
B. THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the world has significantly benefitted from Pax 
Americana. This has witnessed the breakdown of barriers in communication and 
economics that had previously been enforced by nation-states. As a result, throughout the 
1990s and 2000s, the global number of deaths as a result of war declined as well as the 
percent of the global population living in extreme poverty.246  For the globalists who had 
predicted that open trade between nations would promote peace, economic prosperity, and 
establish a more modern world-order, these decades were evidence of truth.247  Buried 
within this economic prosperity, though, are the trends of globalization, urbanization, and 
littoralization which are increasingly changing this global environment.  
Perhaps the most impactful of the current global trends has been globalization itself. 
Globalization is an umbrella term used to describe the interconnectivity of the international 
community as a result of transnational economics and associated technological 
advancement.248  The combination of these two factors has facilitated a rise in the transfer 
of capital between countries. As noted by the economist Anthony Giddens, “...the biggest 
difference is in the level of finance and capital flows. Geared as it is to electronic money – 
money that exists only as digits in computers – the current world economy has no parallels 
in earlier times.”249  This accelerated transfer of currency has led to the growth of 
transnational corporations, which in turn has funded investments in technological and 
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consumer products, particularly those associated with communications. As a result, 
societies around the world, even those who have been historically isolated from external 
influences, are being inundated with foreign culture. As Anna Simons notes, in more 
traditional/tribal communities, this imposition of external influence has resulted in violent 
reactions or “nativism.”250  As exemplified by Islamist terrorism, this “nativism” can be 
used to foment insurgencies or induce terrorist actions.251 
For many emerging societies, globalization has been beneficial to their economies 
while resources have been plentiful; there is however, a growing downside. As a result of 
economic growth and increases in the previously mentioned standard of living, the global 
population has experienced unprecedented and near exponential growth.252  This 
population growth has not been equally distributed and the majority has taken place in 
under-developed nations.253  In some cases, the resultant decline in resources available 
combined with “small wars,” has caused mass migrations, particularly to littoral areas 
where trade, as a result of globalization, continues to thrive.254  In other regions, the 
demand for government provision of security and prosperity has increased making 
governance progressively more difficult.255  An example of this can be found along 
Lebanon’s coast, where over a million refugees from the Syrian Civil War have emigrated 
and threaten to destabilize an already-strained government.  
Linked to the demand for better governance is that these issues rarely remain within 
the confines of the state. This has made singular governments’ management more 
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challenging as non-governmental power brokers “block or circumvent political action.”256  
Externally, this has resulted in evolving state interests, which in some cases has 
necessitated the growth of coalitions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and 
the European Union and in others, led to requests for support from great power states. 
Internally, though, the inability of governments to meet their populations’ governance 
demand has left power vacuums which are then filled by Violent Extremist Organizations 
(VEO), insurgents, local strongmen, and/or proxy militias.  All of these factors have 
contributed to the diminishment of state power particularly in the Middle East and Latin 
America.257  
Great power states’ societies have generally been unaffected by the decline of 
resources and mass migration occurring in emerging countries. This is not to say that these 
societies are not depleting their own and the world’s resource availability, but rather that 
the impact has not been felt to the same degree yet and, as a consequence, consumer 
demand has not yet changed. This is mostly resultant from the positive economic effect of 
globalization, technological investment, and the build-up of these governments’ militaries 
as power projection platforms. As the pace of technology development, populations, and 
consumption increase, the reciprocal demand for resources is also increased. This has and 
will continue to lead great power states closer to confrontation.258 
Figure 6 is a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) which graphicly depicts the current 
global environment and emphasizes the aforementioned factors which are driving Great 
Power Competition. CLDs help individuals to “see” problems systemically rather than 
linearly by mapping the relationship between independent and dependent variables and 
assigning a positive or negative polarity.259  This polarity indicates whether the 
independent variable results in the same (positive) or opposite (negative) effect in the 
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dependent variable. If increasing/decreasing the independent variable causes the dependent 
variable to increase/decrease beyond what it otherwise would have been, a positive polarity 
is assigned. Reciprocally, if increasing/decreasing the independent variable causes the 
dependent variable to decrease/increase beyond what it otherwise would have been, a 
negative polarity is assigned. With this in mind, a CLD can help analyze a problem as 
complex as the current global environment through “the identification of the behavior of 
feedback structures at play within bounded systems and subsystems.”260  The loops formed 
in this process can be either balancing (opposing exponential growth) or reinforcing 
(displaying exponential growth) 
In this case, three balancing loops (B) demonstrate that economic growth will 
continue to drive international trade, leading to the depletion of natural resources and 
compelling the aforementioned state evolution and interest. The reinforcing loop (R) 
demonstrates that more economic growth will continue to result in greater 
interconnectedness between peoples and likely result in more “nativism.”  The key 
takeaway from this diagram, though, is the central role that economic growth has played 
in leading to the current “Great Power Competition.”  The outcome of this analysis is that 
the global trends that have dominated the last two decades stem from globalization and will 
continue unless otherwise abated. This means that the current environment of “Great Power 
Competition” will continue in parallel to “small wars.”  In fact, nuclear deterrence between 
great power states increases the likelihood that proxy warfare such as UW will dominate 
future conflict between great powers.  
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Figure 6. Causal loop diagram of the strategic nature of the environment 
C. THE COMPETITIVE SPACE 
As the confrontation between the U.S. and its peers / near peers seems inevitable, 
it is necessary to examine the U.S. defense strategy to determine USSF’s role in the future. 
Perhaps the most important concept of the 2018 National Defense Strategy is the direction 
to “increase the competitive space.”261  The Army’s recent publication Multi-Domain 
Operations (MDO) has done an excellent job at reorienting the force toward multi-modal 
operations designed to penetrate and “dis-integrate” conventional challengers in large-
scale battle.262  The goal of this concept is to maintain the inter-domain dominance 
advantages the Army has benefitted from during the GWOT in the event that great power 
competition becomes great power combat.   
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SOF’s success and consequent growth during GWOT have clearly manifested itself 
in the MDO concept. However, in its current form, the MDO concept depicts SOF as acting 
either in support of a larger campaign or preventing instability by building partner 
capacity.263  While USSF must be prepared to support a larger strategy by conducting 
these operations, there is another operation that has even greater strategic utility: UW. As 
the “only element in the U.S. Armed Forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically 
for UW,” USSF must remain focused, organized, and prepared to conduct these 
operations.264   
To better understand the total value that USSF can provide in this regard, it is 
necessary to briefly examine the operations of our opponents. These opponents have, 
through an application of UW and hybrid warfare strategies, routinely “outmaneuvered 
their seemingly less nimble U.S. competitor.”265  This examination is not intended to 
provide a complete picture of each nation’s SOF and UW activities but rather to provide a 
snapshot of current required capability with which USSF must be prepared to compete.  
D. COMPETITIVE WORLD ACTORS 
1. Russia 
In his 2007 speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, President Putin 
decried the U.S. dominated global order stating that the “unipolar model is not only 
unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world.”266  This speech signaled that Russia 
was not only breaking from the concept of U.S. leadership but also Putin’s desire to roll 
back western advances in the Russian sphere of influence.  However, the Russian Army’s 
poor performance during the Georgian War in 2008 made it clear to the Kremlin that 
competition on the global stage in the 21st century required military reform. In a unique 
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maneuver in 2008, the Russian military decreased in size while increasing funding by a 
third.267  The result was an efficient, mobile, and adaptable force which borrowed from 
traditional Russian military strengths such as maskirovka (deception) and reflexive control 
as well as from western powers’ SOF capability.268  The appointment of General Valery 
Gerasimov in 2012 and his advocation for the inclusion of non-military means as a 
component of war, furthered the new Russian hybrid warfare capability.269  The first test 
of the revised Russian way of war came in 2013–2014 with the annexation of Crimea and 
outbreak of violence in the eastern Ukraine.  
Following weeks of rioting in Kiev and the departure of the pro-Russian Ukrainian 
President Yanukovych, the focus of the Kremlin’s interest shifted from national control 
toward annexation of wealthy regions along the Ukraine’s eastern border. The first step 
toward this goal was the annexation of Crimea, a predominantly ethnic Russian region of 
the country. While western reporters and analysts observed, pro-Russian separatist units 
took control of key facilities backed by unknown soldiers who wore sterile uniforms. 
Despite these units being clearly of Russian origin, President Putin’s claims that there were 
no Russian units participating in the secession left western news reporters dumbfounded as 
to what to label these units, so they became known as “the little green men.”   
As time progressed, more has become known about these “little green men” and 
they have gone from shallow anonymity to being recognized as Russian SOF.  In the days 
leading up to the Crimean referendum, Russian SOF quietly infiltrated Crimea to conduct 
reconnaissance, organize separatist units, create a sense of chaos, and, when the time was 
right, execute limited direct-action operations.270  These actions, which included the 
seizure of the Crimean Parliament building, enabled the passage of a secession referendum 
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and the subsequent request for Russian annexation. Throughout this campaign, information 
operations retained primacy and enabled the Kremlin to shape the environment while 
simultaneously providing greater “flexibility and efficiency” to the Russian SOF units on 
the ground.271  These actions were so adeptly synchronized that at the time of the Crimean 
parliament referendum vote, Kiev was still searching for a means to respond. Russian SOF, 
backed by well-developed information operations, were able to create a fait accompli 
before Kiev or NATO could muster an effective response.272 
Following the Russian annexation of Crimea, additional Russian SOF units began 
to appear in other regions of Eastern Ukraine. While the Kremlin’s operations in Crimea 
benefitted from a predominantly ethnic Russian population and local popular support, its 
UW operations in eastern Ukraine did not. As a consequence, Russian SOF were forced to 
take a more active role in inciting rebellion, conducting sabotage operations, intelligence 
collection, and directing attacks against Ukrainian military targets. As early as April 2014, 
Russian SOF units (again without insignia) were observed training local separatist units in 
several cities within the Donbas region of the Ukraine.273  Had it not been for Ukrainian 
nationalist resistance units, the return of Ukrainian conscription, and sanctions by NATO, 
the Russian operations in Eastern Ukraine would likely have ended in a similar result as 
Crimea. Now, even after the deployment of thousands of Russian regulars to the region, 
combat has ground into stalemate.274  While the fate of the Donbass region remains 
unclear, what is clear is that 21st century UW requires an adaptable force capable of 
conducting a range of activities including covert and clandestine operations in support of a 
detailed information operations campaign. Table 1 highlights the adaptability Russian SOF 
demonstrated in the Crimea and Donbas campaigns.   
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Table 1. Russian SOF operations in Ukraine.275 
 Crimea Donbas 
Direct action  X 
Special reconnaissance X X 
Military assistance  X 
Covert action X X 
 
The totality of Russian Special Operations cannot be understood without 
considering its use of Private Military Contractors (PMC) to further its objectives while 
providing the Kremlin greater deniability. In 2007, the Russian Duma and the Federation 
Council passed a law allowing companies to legally use arms and “special means” for the 
procurement and transfer of hydrocarbons.276  This initial narrow focus of Russian PMCs 
expanded as operations in the Ukraine ground to a stalemate and requests for support began 
to arrive from Syria, Russia’s strategic partner in the Middle East. While PMC are 
ostensibly private, their ownership by wealthy oligarchs with direct ties to the Kremlin has 
made these organizations an extension of Russia’s foreign policy.277  The colocation of 
the Wagner Group, a premier Russian PMC company, and the 10th Special Forces Brigade 
as well as its ownership by Yevgeny Prigozhin, an oligarch with direct ties to Putin further 
validates this fact.278  
Whether operating in the Ukraine or in Syria, the Wagner Group’s actions closely 
mirrored those of other Russian SOF units. This deliberate ambiguity has further provided 
Putin with deniability of Russian activity while maintaining an adept expeditionary UW 
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capability. This force’s total capability was put on display when hundreds of Wagner PMC 
and attached Syrian Army units attacked a U.S. / Kurdish base in Eastern Syria.279   
On February 7, 2018, after a week-long build-up of men and materiel, Wagner PMC 
equipped with T-72 tanks, artillery and mortars attacked a small outpost containing 
approximately 40 U.S. SOF and Kurdish Syrian Defense Force fighters. While the 
motivation for this attack was most likely to seize the massive Conoco oil fields, the truly 
fascinating factor was the tenaciousness of the attackers. As noted by Sean McFate, these 
forces did not waiver but pressed their attack for four hours under relentless air attack by 
U.S. rotary and fixed wing aircraft as well as High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 
(HIMARS).280  This clearly indicates that the Russian PMC was trained and equipped to 
fight against an aggressive adversary. Moreover, it demonstrates that Russia is prepared to 
use its PMCs like SOF to achieve political objectives which, had they originated from a 
less ambiguous organization, would have been declared an act of war.  
2. China 
Despite its revolutionary origins and Mao’s central role in formulating international 
UW strategy, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is noticeably lacking a SOF UW 
capability. This capability gap is especially interesting considering that during the Cold 
War, China adeptly conducted UW operations as part of its strategy to expand communism 
throughout Asia. The current gap in a SOF UW force highlights that China’s strategy sees 
no need for the capability. Rather than investing in military UW as a means of power 
projection, PLA SOF capability more closely resembles that of the U.S. Army Ranger 
Regiment, which focuses on swift Direct-Action missions in support of a national 
objective.281  This deliberate choice indicates the China’s belief that “non-military 
warfare” is the future form of global competition.282   
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In what has become a founding document for the PLA’s current operations, the 
book Unrestricted Warfare highlighted the need for China to change “the views of what is 
the key arena for conflict.”283  As Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, the authors 
of Unrestricted Warfare, noted, the release of the “technological plague” represents the 
opening of a pandora’s box.284  In this case, though, the box comes with a “charm,” and 
leads the authors toward developing several non-military means to achieve China’s 
strategic objectives through political warfare grounded in information control. 
Examining China’s military capability, which is designed to create “political power 
for the party, lacks a clear concept for appreciating political warfare.”285 However, detailed 
examination of China’s strategy and use of non-military means to effect similar ends as 
USSF is beyond the scope of this research. Instead, we note that, like Russia, China has 
weaponized information and adeptly uses it to conduct political warfare.  
3. Islamic Republic of Iran 
While not referred to as a “great power” in the National Security Strategy, the 
actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in the realm of UW have been well 
documented. This matters because, as noted in the Joint Operating Environment 2035, the 
ability of regional powers to attain global reach will likely result in increased competition 
throughout multiple domains.286  A brief examination into how regional powers like the 
IRI have used SOF to hit above their weight class on the geopolitical stage is therefore 
appropriate.  
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Almost from its inception, the IRI has been able to asymmetrically oppose U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East through the use of SOF-trained proxy forces. The linkages 
between the revolution in 1979, the subsequent “republic,” and extremist organizations 
such as the Palestine Liberation Organization.287  Nevertheless, the ability of Iran to 
oppose U.S. goals and initiatives in the Middle East despite recourse has enabled them to 
obtain several key strategic objectives. For example, in the early 1980s in Lebanon, the 
Quds Force, the IRI’s premier SOF unit, was able to train, arm, equip, and advise 
previously disparate Shia militia groups to join forces under the Lebanese Hezbollah (L.H.) 
umbrella.288  After just a few years, the fledgling proxy movement was able to force the 
U.S. and Israeli militaries to withdraw.289   
Despite the unprecedented success of LH in the 1980s, it was the IRI’s war with 
Iraq and realization of conventional weakness that solidified Iran’s affinity for proxies and 
UW operations.290  This continued focus has enabled LH to achieve not only a standing 
army with advanced weapons but also political backing as part of an influential block 
within Lebanon’s government. This move toward local credibility was bolstered by LH’s 
information dominance. As noted by Hoffman, the transformation of focus was 
exemplified during the 2006 Lebanon War when “the battle for perception dominance was 
just as critical as the strategic strike competition and the gritty defense of the villages in 
southern Lebanon.”291  A trained and advised UW force tied to an information warfare 
dominated strategy was able to produce effects below the threshold of retaliation against 
the true sponsor. 
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The scope and proximity of American involvement in the region seems to have no 
effect on the decision-making calculus of Iran to attempt to thwart U.S. plans through UW. 
For instance, in Iraq, as early as 2003, the Quds Force began training, equipping, and 
advising thousands of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army to counter U.S. military 
objectives.292  While trainers assisted the Mahdi Army in building its core cadre and 
development of tactics, the injection of Iranian technology to increase the human cost of 
U.S. involvement in Iraq had a hastening effect on the U.S. withdrawal. The ability of Iran 
to compete with the U.S. asymmetrically through the use of UW proxies and information 
warfare dominance again enabled strategic effects.  
Since the U.S. departure from Iraq in 2011, subsequent regional civil wars saw the 
IRI’s need for capable SOF grow (see Figure 7). In Syria, the ability of Iranian Quds Force 
to work alongside the Syrian Army is an illustration of Foreign Internal Defense as 
described in the U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Operations Training Circular.293  Here, the 
Quds force exemplified a long-held belief within USSF that the best UW force can also 
provide the best assistance in a Counter-Insurgency campaign. For instance, shortly after 
arriving, Quds Force officers “encourage [d] Assad to restore access to social media 
internet sites he had blocked and then showed the Syrians how to track [and target] 
opponents through their Facebook and Twitter accounts.”294  As noted in a recent study 
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Figure 7. Estimation of Quds Force partners 2011–2018.296 
While the IRI was in the middle of supporting the Assad regime in western Syria, 
the civil war spilled out of the country to the east and into Iraq. This threatened to undo the 
decade of progress the IRI had made in Iraq and represented a strategic problem for the 
IRI. Once again, the IRI was able to capitalize on weakness and instability to attain greater 
control over its neighbor. As ISIS forces marched through Mosul and Fallujah and 
threatened Baghdad, many Iraqi volunteers opted to join the Popular Mobilization Forces 
(PMF) rather than the collapsing Iraqi military and police units. These PMF forces backed 
by Iran swelled in strength and in political reputation or as one PMF fighter stated: “you 
can criticize any politician or even religious cleric, but you cannot speak against the Hashd 
[PMF] and its martyrs.”297  The effect of this standing “heroes army” in Iraq has been to 
create further division within the political sphere to enable greater opportunities for Iranian 
influence and control. Moreover, this provides an example of how the IRI through the 
employment of adaptable SOF was able to support conventional forces in one region while 
building an irregular force in a neighboring country simultaneously.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT 
While many scholars, experts, and defense analysts have prophesied about the 
future of warfare, most have focused on the technological aspects about the future of 
warfare. As a result, futurist literature is replete with predictions of cyber Armageddon 
scenarios which then drive investment and focus from the DoD into acquiring more 
technology.298   While developing and incorporating new and revolutionary technological 
advancements is critical to the success of the SFOD-A, the reality will be quite like the past 
competitive environment of the cold war. Rather than massed armies invading territories 
or truly crippling cyber-attacks, modern warfare seeks to advance the political agendas of 
the state strictly below the threshold for conventional war. However, whether by 
conventional or irregular means, modern war but still capable of producing political end-
states. As a result, our opponents in the modern continuum are increasing their capacity to 
conduct warfare below the threshold of a conventional response while still eliciting positive 
results.299   
Whether it is called political warfare, information warfare, or UW, the ability to 
influence the mind of the population remains the center of gravity and should be the focus 
for increasing lethality for the SFOD-A. As demonstrated previously in Chapter V, as 
economic growth and relative international prosperity continue to increase, the likelihood 
of this (what this?) form of warfare increases. It is therefore necessary for the U.S. military 
to maintain a force organized to be capable of either conducting or defeating these 
operations with regularity. Current USASOC strategy dictates that for ARSOF to be 
competitive in the future environment, one of the essential risks necessary for enabling 
success it to divest of legacy missions and force structure.(add USASOC strategy citation) 
This future force cannot be massed formations but rather ought to be smaller units equipped 
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and empowered with the requisite capabilities and permissions to accomplish this mission. 
As noted by T.E. Lawrence, “the smaller the unit the better its performance.”300 
B. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES (FUTURE) 
As noted by the first SFOD-A model in Chapter II, the current environment of Great 
Power Competition (GPC) emulates a similar environment which the U.S. faced during the 
Cold War. When assessing the future capability of the SFOD-A, it is therefore necessary 
to examine the capability of the SFOD-A during the Cold War. However, as terrorists 
continue to threaten our nation, it is also necessary to examine the capabilities of the SFOD-
A throughout the GWOT to ensure that those valuable lessons learned are not forgotten. 
Therefore, any recommended change to the SFOD-A cannot be a step backward but must 
rather build upon existing capability. To that end, the following recommended change is a 
combination of the examination of the past, the current global trends and most likely future 
environment. 
The current focus of the U.S. military’s manning, training, and equipping for 
potential large-scale ground combat is likely to require additional SOF capabilities and 
operations. This increased requirement for SOF capabilities will occur for three reasons. 
First, the increased capability of our conventional forces and the United States’ nuclear 
deterrence, will most likely mean a return to a “cold-war atmosphere” requiring an increase 
in covert and clandestine deployments, not large-scale wars. Second, adversaries like 
Russia, China, and Iran, will continue to turn toward asymmetric options to create room 
within the competitive space to achieve their interests. These operations will, by design, 
deny the U.S. the ability to respond conventionally. Finally, as has been the case since 
President Eisenhower’s administration, a primary means that the United States will employ 
to counter aggression will be through the development of partners and allies. Following 
historic precedent, the force that will be most heavily relied upon for these operations will 
be USSF.  
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Adversarial investment in asymmetric means to achieve effects does not mean that 
the U.S. should divest of large-scale conventional capability as this would give up 
conventional deterrence. However, the shift in focus by the conventional military may give 
state and non-state actors additional space to develop into more robust networks with 
increased capability. This capability increase has the potential to edge the U.S. out of the 
competitive space changing the status quo of U.S. hegemony. Therefore, it is incumbent 
upon USSF to cover any gaps left by the transition of focus. To do this appropriately, USSF 
must modernize in parallel though not in mirror as it did while supporting the AirLand 
Battle operating concept.  
U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) identified that U.S. 
adversaries are already creating leverage in the competitive space by weaponizing 
information to gain effects without provoking a conventional military response.301  To 
combat this threat, the USASOC Commander, has directed the force to “power-down” 
mission command to the lowest levels to achieve success.302  The strategy goes on to state 
that USASOC “will expand and leverage our irregular warfare capabilities and partnership 
networks [while operationalizing] the CONUS base whenever possible to support 
information warfare.” 303  Finally, the strategy states that readiness success “will be 
achieved using cyber and information warfare in all aspects of training.” 304  As defined 
by ADP 3–05 Army Special Operations, “in today’s complex and rapidly evolving 
information environment, perceptions, decisions, and, ultimately, behavior are influenced 
by the psychological effects of actions and information.”305  Following the USASOC 
Commander’s “power-down” guidance it is necessary to incorporate information 
operations capability at the lowest level.  
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Historically, SFOD-As have relied upon PSYOP attachments to achieve 
information dominance. Like the challenges which SOF face in continually providing 
relevance to conventional commanders. These attachments have performed well in past 
conflicts, and in the case of the CIDG, have resulted in short-term organizational adaptation 
of the SFOD-A. This temporary additive capability enhancement was again reflected 
during VSO operations in Afghanistan highlighting the fact that while PSYOP is a core 
competency of USSF, it is something that individual soldiers receive little training on and 
are almost never validated in. If USSF is to be successful in Great Power Competition by 
gaining information dominance, it is necessary to exceed the capability of U.S. adversaries 
to leverage information. This means that rather than simply attaching PSYOP specialists 
to a SFOD-A when necessary, information dominance must be the umbrella under which 
all other operations take place. This is unlikely to happen if it is not trained consistently 
within the SFOD-A and integrated throughout operational planning and execution.  
To meet the stated goals of the USASOC strategy, excel in the current environment, 
and remain operationally and strategically relevant, the authors recommend the creation of 
an additional PSYOP skill within the SFOD-A. This should be done without adding 
additional personnel to the unit, as this would also bring an untold number of logistical 
adjustments. The capability adaptation should instead be treated as an individual skill with 
associated MOS identification, like SOTACs.  By having a subject matter expert embedded 
and advising SFOD-A commanders, it would provide a “bottom up” approach toward 
building the information umbrella that is ubiquitous during modern U.W. and COIN.  
As USSF prepares to modernize in support of Great Power Competition, 
incorporating PSYOP skills will enhance partners efforts to recruit and build popular 
support. As partners’ capability increases, the indigenous approach that USSF is best suited 
for will be reinforced. This increase in relevancy will decrease the likelihood of adaptations 
of USSF for unilateral / direct roles such as were seen during the post-Vietnam time period. 
Moreover, as other SOF units begin to modernize, it is likely that they will focus heavily 
on their respective core capabilities. The reinforcement of focus of USSF on indigenous 
populations through partner operations under an information dominance umbrella will 
ensure the U.S. is not left with a capability gap.  
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The individual training for the USSF soldier should be done without creating an 
additional course at the John F. Kennedy Special Forces Center and School (SWCS), as 
this would necessarily mean additional soldiers being removed from their detachments to 
serve as instructors. As the current PSYOP course falls under SWCS and is manned by 
individuals with years of PSYOP experience, SWCS should reserve billets for USSF 
soldiers to attend relevant sections of the PSYOP course. In so doing, SWCS would enable 
an expedited course for USSF soldiers who already have core SOF capabilities such as 
language training and small unit tactics. Equipping these soldiers with necessary equipment 
at the SFOD-A would accrue cost but this could be differed by dual using equipment such 
as cameras and computers that are already organic to the SFOD-A.  
Finally, the addition of USSF PSYOP specialists on the SFOD-A would not have 
no negative effect on the relevancy of traditional PSYOP specialists. As necessary, SFOD-
As should still request Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPT) to augment their deployments but 
instead of these teams working on basic PSYOP tasks, they would enable larger 
distribution and messaging. This would reciprocally enhance the information dominance 
umbrella of the SFOD-As operations while having the added benefit of decreasing 
tribalism between the two branches.    
As USSF prepares to modernize in support of Great Power Competition, it is 
necessary to understand historic modernization efforts that resulted in the adaptation of the 
SFOD-A. With a sound understanding of the environment and missions that drove these 
adaptations, it becomes clear that the prevailing cause of transformation was the desire to 
remain relevant. If USSF is to stay ahead of the relevancy curve, it stands to reason that 
information dominance at the lowest level is critical to the success of operations in the 
information age. However, while this is one recommended change, the intention of this 
thesis has been to provide future research with a solid historic grounding from which to 
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